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Legal and Policy Responses to the 
Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or 




In recent years a number of law review articles and a 
recent Harvard University Press publication have all sought to 
tackle the question of academic ownership, with many of the 
works titled something like, “Who owns academic work,” and 
“Who owns course materials.”1  These articles reflect the 

* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
 Ph.D., European History, University of California, Los Angeles, 1998; J.D, 
The University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, 2002; LL.M., The 
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, expected 2003.  A 
great number of people have helped me with this article, in their willingness 
to answer questions and point me in different directions.  Thank you to Dean 
Toni Massaro, Alfred Yen, Kay Kavanagh, Sara Heitshu, Georgia Harper, 
David Perry, Nick Goodman, Andrew Silverman, Graeme Austin, Erica 
Rocush, SPARC, Jerrold E. Hogle, Sarita and Robert Townsend, Ron Gard, 
Dalia Tsuk, David Gantz, and Laurence Serra, who began this whole long 
journey with his innocent question of whether as an adjunct he owned the 
materials he created for a law course. 
 1. One work in the last year that received a good deal of attention was 
CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK: BATTLING FOR CONTROL 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001).  McSherry’s argument seems to 
discourage academics from using the law and court systems to protect their 
work, demonizing those who do and accusing them of changing the tone of the 
university into a space fearing litigation.  She also suggests that academics 
should not ask for anything more than what they are given, for fear of losing a 
gift economy, safe from a commercialized space.  McSherry’s subtitle, “Battling 
for Control of Intellectual Property,” should have been “Surrendering Control.”  
See id. (emphasis added).  This essay was written in great part before 
McSherry’s book was released, but in many ways can be seen as a response to 
her positions.  For other examples, see Georgia Holmes and Daniel A. Levin, 
Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by a Teacher or Professor? The 
Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in the Internet Age, 2000 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 165, and Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who Owns the Copyright 
to Faculty-Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine’s Applicability to 
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uncertainty in just who does own academic work: the 
university/school-employer or the scholar/teacher-creator.  This 
article seeks to add to this discussion in three specific ways: 
first, by tracing the evolution of the disappearance of the 
“teacher exception,” and arguing against the notion that the 
1976 Copyright Act signaled its demise; second, by looking at 
samples of what universities are currently constructing in their 
intellectual property policies regarding copyright ownership; 
and finally, by giving concrete suggestions to scholars who are 
concerned about keeping creative control of their works. 
The world of copyright ownership in the university is in 
flux.  This is a recent development.  Before 1987, most believed 
that scholars owned their creative works, even though they 
were made for the classroom or during working hours.  By 
owning one’s creations under the “teacher exception,” a teacher 
had freedom to use the works at other universities, make 
alternations and new creations from the initial works, and 
occasionally reap profit from publishing textbooks or, in rare 
cases, monographs.  Today, the growing trend is to see the 
“teacher exception” as created not by judge-made law, but by 
individual university policies.  Universities decide what they 
want to own and what they give back to the scholar/teacher-
creator.  The motives behind the policies are often the potential 
commercial profits of distance learning and other Internet-
related opportunities. 
Commercialization permeates the university, from the 
technology transfer offices that assist with licensing and 
patents in the sciences, to the enormous energy put into the 
commercial potential of sports, through broadcast rights, 
corporate sponsorship, and trademarked university 
merchandise.  In recent years, the profit potential of distance 
learning and other multimedia projects have sparked the 
imagination of administrators and for-profit companies to mine 
the copyrighted works produced in classrooms across the 
university campus.  But it is too easy simply to complain or 
rejoice that the university has become more corporate- or 
market- driven.  We must first explore the context of this 
increased commercialization in the university.  For copyrighted 
works, this means looking into changes in ownership and the 
disappearance of the “teacher exception” in the 1990s.  This 
article focuses on academic copyrighted work – creations from 

Internet Resources Created for Distance Learning and Traditional Classroom 
Courses, 41 B.C. L. REV. 549 (2000). 
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teaching, research, and writing – and how spaces of ownership 
are changing in universities entering the twenty-first century. 
Questions of copyright ownership, prior to the Internet, 
were generally limited to discussions centering around the 
unauthorized publication of lecture notes by third parties not 
associated with the university.2  From this, courts historically 
have given teachers ownership in lecture notes and other 
copyrighted works in what has become known as the “teacher 
exception.”  Ownership gave teachers the autonomy needed for 
academic freedom, the ability to produce materials without 
interference regarding content, and the control to determine 
when a work should be published—both in the subjective sense 
as to when an author believes a work to be ready and the 
objective sense as to the timing of all the stages that lead up to 
constitute publication.  Additionally, by owning the materials, 
academics were also able to take established lectures and 
deliver them to a new crowd of students when the academic 
moved to a different university, either permanently or 
temporarily.  This notion of “teacher exception” has been called 
into question in the last twenty years, in part because of the 
new copyright law of 1976, and in part because of new 
technologies that increased potential economic interest in 
course content, scholarly writings, distance learning, 
commercial note-taking ventures, and multimedia and software 
projects. 
Part I introduces the reader to the changing nature of the 
university as a commercialized environment, looking in 
particular at the development of profits for the university from 
patents and licensing in the university.  Parts II, III, and IV 
form the core of the paper, which looks at how this new 
corporate culture is transforming copyrighted works 
throughout the university. Part II explains the basics of 
copyright and ownership of copyrighted materials in order to 
better understand the nature of the current struggles at hand.  
Part III traces the debates over and changes in the 1976 
Copyright Law and relevant case law, and gives an explanation 
for the noticeable omission of the “teacher exception” in the 
1976 Copyright Act.  Part IV reviews some of the responses in 
the form of university policies around the country.  Part V ends 
with suggestions of ways in which students, scholars, teachers, 
and other academics might approach their intellectual property 

 2. See infra Part IV. 
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creations in this new environment. 
I. THE SPACES OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE 
UNIVERSITY 
Commercialization in the universities has, until recently, 
focused on the impact of the 1980 congressional legislation that 
gave universities the ability to patent and license scientific 
inventions and discoveries to outside corporate entities.3  Eyal 
Press and Jennifer Washburn’s article,  “The Kept University,” 
provides a nice window into the current concerns.4  The article 
begins with the illustration of a scientist, who peers into a 
microsope.5  We see a cartoon-like representation of what the 
scientist is viewing overlayed with a large dollar sign.6  
Washburn and Press describe the increasing prevalence of 
corporate money throughout the university’s science 
communities as well as its effect on the humanities.7  Through 
anecdotal stories, Press and Washburn present some of the 
most troubling developments in this area.8 
One example concerns Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company “and producer of genetically engineered crops,” 
agreeing to fund $25 million of basic research at Berkeley’s 
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology.9  In return, 
Novartis had first right to negotiate on one-third of the 
department’s discoveries, even if the research was government-
funded.10  Moreover, Novartis was given two of the five seats on 
the department’s research committee.11  The latter agreement, 
according to Press and Washburn, was unprecedented, 12 
sparking concerns over academic freedom and free exchange of 
ideas.  One scientist explained, “[t]his deal institutionalizes the 

 3. See David Bollier, The Enclosure of the Academic Commons, 
ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18. 
 4. Eyal Press and Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39,  available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/03/press.htm [hereinafter Press and 
Washburn].  Thank you to Kay Kavanagh, who put a copy of this in my 
mailbox. 
 5. Id. at 39.  The illustration is by Seymour Chwast. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 40. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 2003] DISAPPEARING TEACHER EXCEPTION 213 
 
university’s relationship with one company, whose interest is 
profit.”13  Press and Washburn also note the increasingly 
common situation where university scientists have stock 
options and other incentives that might affect the impartiality 
of their research results.14  Furthermore, companies are 
requiring scientists to keep research secret for longer than they 
normally would, thereby stifling the community of sharing 
traditionally created within the sciences in the universities.15  
Press and Washburn also cite studies finding that industry-
sponsored research produced more industry-beneficial 
conclusions than research not funded by industry.16 
Most of the attention has been paid to profitable patents in 
the university, as the Press and Washburn article 
demonstrates.  However, fears abound as to where the 
commercialization of the university will lead.  Some, like 
intellectual property professor James Boyle, fear that this 
intense privatization of scientific research at the university 
level will lead to “creators [being] prevented from creating,” as 
the availability of material in the public domain drastically 
diminishes.17 Others fear that the humanities will receive even 
less funding and that departments will be cut because, in the 
view of a market-economy, less profitable departments will be 
less viable as they provide little economic capital.18  For this 
paper, however, the focus is not on these apocolyptic concerns, 
but rather on the consequences or implications of this move 
towards greater commercialization and its impact on our 
understanding of the role of copyrighted materials within the 
university. 
The story of the transformation of the university into a 
more commercialized environment often centers on the impact 
of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which first gave universities the 

 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 41. 
 15. Id. at 41-42. 
 16. Id. at 42. 
Mildred Cho, a senior research scholar at Stanford’s Center for 
Biomedical Ethics. . .found [in his 1996 study published in the Annals 
of Internal Medicine, March 1, 1996, at 485-489] that 98 percent of 
papers based on industry-sponsored research reflected favorably on 
the drugs examined, as compared with 79 percent of papers based on 
research not funded by industry. 
Id. 
 17. Id. at 48.  There have been a great number of movements in this area, 
for example by law professors James Boyle and Laurence Lessig. 
 18. Id. at 51. 
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ability to own patents on projects funded by government 
research money.19  However, in the United States, an event 
over a hundred years earlier changed the trajectory of the 
elitist European-based model of the university to one more 
focused on commerce and industry.  The Morrill Act of 1862 
created land-grant universities whose missions became not only 
teaching and research, but also public service.20  In part, public 
service was seen as developing research that could help 
strengthen the United States as an agricultural and industrial 
power: “The classical view of knowledge for knowledge’s sake 
was supplanted by the public-service mission of ‘knowledge for 
use.’”21  Currently, there are 105 land-grant institutions in the 
United States, with 29 tribal colleges.22  In the intervening 
years since the Morrill Act’s initial passage in 1862, additional 
programs have been added to support higher learning.23  
However, the impact of the connection between the university 
and industry/agriculture went far beyond the land-grant 
institutions and helped to frame the concept of the role of the 
modern university in the United States.24 

 19. The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517 
(1980).  See also Council on Governmental Relations, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, at 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/bayh.html (last visited September 15, 2002). 
 20. Steven Andersen , IP 101 Research Partners Face Culture Clash, 
CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1999, at 2.  For the text of the Morrill Act see 
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, First 
Morrill Act, at 
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/LandMorrill.htm (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
 21. Anderson, supra note 20, at 1.  For a brief history on land-grant 
colleges and universities, see National Association of State Universities and 
Land-Grant Colleges, The Land-Grant Tradition, at 
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Land_Grant_Main.htm (last 
visited September 15, 2002).  A bibliography on the Land-Grant tradition is 
provided at 
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Further_Reading.htm. 
 22. National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, 
The 105 Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, at 
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Schools.htm, (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
 23. See, e.g., National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant 
Colleges, A Chronology of Federal Legislation Affecting Public Higher 
Education at 
http://www.nasulgc.org/publications/Land_Grant/Chronology.htm (last visited, 
September 15, 2002) (listing various pieces of federal legislation concerning 
higher education between 1787 and 1994). 
 24. The problems confronting the modern university are not limited to 
land-grant or even U.S. institutions.  See Richard Poydner, Ownership Tussle 
in Ivory Towers, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), September 9, 2002, Inside Track 
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In order to further encourage universities to forge ties to 
industry and business, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980, which allowed universities to obtain patents created with 
federally-funded research.25  In prepared testimony before the 
House Committee on Science, Fawwaz T. Ulaby, Vice President 
of Research at the University of Michigan, proudly reported 
that the economic boom of the 1990s was in great part due to 
this new development, as universities and corporations 
collaborated to create new commerce and economic prosperity.26  
The Bayh-Dole Act transformed the sciences in the universities 
and has created new pockets of wealth for universities, with 
technology transfer offices27 in universities becoming centers of 
significant activity.28  For instance, the University of California 

Law & Business, at 16 (“A dispute over intellectual property rights (IPR) at 
the University of Cambridge has raised questions about academics’ legal 
status and the increasing trend for universities to view themselves as 
businesses.”).  See also, Ross Anderson, Not Broken, Don’t Fix it, TIMES 
HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT, August 9, 2002 (“From 2003, patents, 
copyrights and trade secrets will be controlled by [Cambridge] university 
bureaucrats rather than us.  Behind the change lurks the Department of 
Trade and Industry.”). 
 25. Council on Governmental Relations, supra note 19.  See also GAO 
finds poor record keeping on federally aided inventions, FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY 
REPORT, August 26, 1999, at 4.  Two laws in addition to the Bayh-Dole Act 
created this environment: the Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act of 1980 and 
one of its amendments, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA), 
both of which focus on government laboratories.  See Prepared statement of 
Maria C. Friere, Ph.D., Director, National Institute of Health Office of 
Technology Transfer, before the Senate Appropriations Committee 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related 
Agencies, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 12, 1999.  Friere’s testimony gives a 
concrete example of how technology transfer works between universities, 
corporate America, and the United States government, which often partially 
funds the research at the universities. 
 26. Friere, supra note 25.  For a corporate view of the impact of the Bayh-
Dole Act, see Prepared Statement by Randolph J. Guschl, Director-Corporate 
Technology Transfer, Dupont Before the House Science Subcommittee, 
Committee on Technology, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar 17, 1998. 
 27. Association of University Technical Managers, Defining Tech 
Transfer, TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW, June, 1998, at 4. 
Technology transfer describes a formal transferring of new discoveries 
and innovations resulting from scientific research conducted at 
universities to the commercial sector . . . through patenting and 
licensing new innovations.  The major steps in this process include: 1) 
disclosing innovations; 2) patenting the innovation concurrent with 
publication of scientific research; and 3) licensing the rights to 
innovations to industry for commercial development. 
Id. 
 28. For the united university support of the Bayh-Dole Act, see University 
Leaders Testify at Bayh-Dole Hearings, 5 (7) TECHNOLOGY ACCESS REPORT, 
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(UC) took its existing central office for all of the universities of 
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright, and transformed it after 
the Bayh-Dole Act into the Office of Technology Transfer.29  
Individual campuses were then given the choice to create their 
own technology transfer and licensing offices, with some 
“provid[ing] management for commercializable software.”30  
Only in 1998 did a University of California Taskforce 
contemplate the need once again for a Copyright Office, with 
more sophisticated issues of ownership surrounding distance 
learning and other market-driven projects.31  The significance 
here is that it shows a shift from general management of 
intellectual property, to a more intense focus on profit-making 
entities, with copyright being seen as negligible to the point 
that an office is not even necessary for the whole University of 
California system.  That the UC Taskforce was thinking in 
1998 of creating a new copyright office is also telling of the 
latest shift in commercial expectations; copyrightable materials 
may be seen as more profitable in the future. 
The numbers from technology transfer are impressive.  The 
Association of University Technology Managers estimates that 
schools in the United States and Canada made $592 million 
from royalties and licenses in one year.32  No longer are 
inventions and discoveries moving into the public domain 
through open publication; universities and corporations are 
capitalizing upon them before they can reach the public 
domain.33  As the Press and Washburn article points out as 
well, this has raised questions as to the whole nature of science, 
tenure, publications, research sharing, and other issues that 
surround the now valuable work in the sciences.34 

May 1994. 
 29. University of California, “Institutional,” UNIVERSITYWIDE TASKFORCE 
ON COPYRIGHT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 1999), at 4 [hereinafter 
UC Taskforce on Copyright]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Brenda Warner Rotzoll, Inventive Colleges Raking, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998. 
 33. Richard R. Nelson explains the universities’ license to patent, 5(2) 
MICRO: THE MICRO-ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS BRANCH BULLETIN 12, 
Summer 1998. 
 34. Press and Washburn, supra note 4.  See also Bronislaus B. Kush, 
Funding can blur line between research and business; Many institutions and 
journals are worried about conflicts, TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE (Worcester, MA)  
Apr. 6, 1998, at A6, Health Care Delivery (noting results of zinc lozenges as 
helping to cure the common cold indicate that the researcher held stock in the 
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In the midst of this great science-based boom, trademark 
licensing of both sports and the university itself also took off, 
and the race to commercialize universities is not limited to 
those two arenas.  In the 1990s, both universities and 
businesses saw new commercial potential for distance learning, 
collaborating in their efforts.  However, they soon found 
themselves at odds over unauthorized commercial note-taking, 
with universities using the law to protect themselves and their 
monopoly on note-taking through state legislation, desist 
letters, and litigation.35 
Already in 1998, David Noble wrote: “During the last two 
decades campus commercialization centered upon the research 
function of the universities, but it has now shifted to the core 
instructional function, the heart and soul of academia.”36  This 
is driven, in great part, by the potential profits universities 
envision from online courses, but universities are also 
protecting themselves against the loss of profits from 
unauthorized commercial note-taking businesses.  According to 
Noble, this push is driven by technology industries and 
corporations “looking for subsidized product development and a 
potentially lucrative market for [instructional hardware and 
software],” creating “a fundamental transformation of the 
nature of academic work and the relationship between higher 
educational institutions and their faculty employees.”37 For-
profit companies, who demand faculty to assign copyright as 

company that made the zinc lozenges: “After the stock soared, the researcher 
sold his shares and made $ 145,000.”). 
 35. A number of recent law review articles have specifically addressed 
issues of distance learning including: Nicolas P. Terry, Bricks Plus Bytes: How 
“Click-and-Brick” Will Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L. REV. 95 
(2001); Chanani Sandler, Comment: Copyright Ownership: A Fundamental of 
Academic Freedom, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & Tech. 231 (2001); Stephanie L. Seeley, 
Note: Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws?  The Case for 
Professors’ Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163 (2001); 
James Ottavio Castagnera, Cory R. Fine and Anthony Belfiore, Protecting 
Intellectual Capital in the New Century: Are Universities Prepared?, 2002 
DUKE  L. & TECH. REV. 10 (June 2002); Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance 
Education and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the 
Culture of Higher Education, 16 TOURO L. REV. 981 (Spring 2000); and Jon 
Garon, The Electronic Jungle: The Application of Intellectual Property Law to 
Distance Education, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 146 (Spring 2002). 
 36. David F. Noble, The Coming Battle over Online Instruction: 
Confidential Agreements Between Universities and Private Companies Pose 
Serious Challenge to Faculty Intellectual Property Rights, DIGITAL DIPLOMA 
MILLS, Part II, Mar. 1998, at 
http://www.communication.ucsd.edu/dl/ddm2.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002). 
 37. Id. 
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part of employment, are using a business model rather than 
university tradition to run many online distance learning 
projects.38 
After interviewing InterEd online education consultant, 
Bob Tucker, reporter Joshua Green declared, “[t]his idea of 
wresting academic control from the faculty is at the heart of 
many business models.”39  Green reported how “Tucker 
convinced Arizona State University to build its online program 
outside the reach of the faculty so it can be run like a business 
and avoid ‘the enormous bureaucratic red tape’ that faculty 
participation necessarily entails.”40  A myriad of universities 
now have online courses, including UCLA, New School of Social 
Research, Arizona State University, and Columbia University, 
to name just a few.41 
Universities are also trying to keep their star faculty from 
appearing in competing online projects.  Harvard law professor 
Arthur Miller was told that he violated his employment 
contract when he agreed to tape eleven lectures for the new 
online Concord University of Law.42  It is a story that has made 
the rounds, for Miller argued that his actions were comparable 
to publishing a textbook, rather than teaching students. 43  He 

 38. Nobles’ two articles detail specific examples of university and for-
profit connections in the online field, often at the faculty’s expense. 
 39. Joshua Green, Superstars Online, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23, 
2000, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/v11/22/green-j-3.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Fathom, Course Providers, at 
http://www.fathom.com/about/course_providers.jhtml  (including courses from 
Arizona State University, Columbia University, the BBC, Kaplan College, 
New School Online University, Sports Business University, UCLA Extension, 
University of British Columbia, University of San Diego, University of 
Washington, Concord Law School, Syracuse University, University at Buffalo, 
University of California Extension, Berkeley, University of Michigan-Flint, 
American Film Institute, the British Library, The British Museum, 
Cambridge University Press, London School of Economics, the Natural History 
Museum, New York Public Library, RAND, the Science Museum, University of 
Chicago, University of Michigan, Victoria & Albert Museum, and Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution) (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).  See also, The 
University Alliance at http://www.universityalliance.com/, which includes 
Jacksonville University, Regis University, Saint Leo University, University of 
South Florida, Villanova University, and eArmyU (the U.S. Army) (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2002). 
 42. See Chanani Sandler, Comment, Copyright Ownership: A 
Fundamental of “Academic Freedom,” 12 ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH. 231, 232 
(2001). 
 43. Erica B. Levy, Harvard Tightens Faculty Policy, HARVARD CRIMSON, 
April 25, 2000, available at Lexis, University News library, University Wire 
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explained that he also had participated in other visual 
endeavors, including selling his own videotapes, hosting a 
public television show, and appearing on Good Morning 
America.  Harvard did not agree, and changed its policies to 
prohibit such online behavior without prior written approval.44 
According to Jon Garon, Professor of Law at Franklin 
Pierce Law Center, some online companies have yet to make a 
profit, even though places like Merrill Lynch “projects the U.S. 
online market in higher education will surge to $7 billion, from 
$1.2 billion, by 2003.”45  He believes that so far the producers 
have been unable to successfully market to the general public, 
and that “the lack of success at Fathom [a consolidator of online 
courses from a myriad of universities, institutions and 
museums] has been attributed to its expensive, long courses.”46  
He also predicts that online courses may find their market in 
community college and corporate training courses.47  He 
explains, “Abstract course content provided by the British 
Museum may be interesting, but Fathom has found no market 
for such content.  In contrast, the University of Phoenix has an 
estimated 27,000 online enrollees for its highly focused, 
practical classes.”48  Even so, Garon and others cite remarkable 
numbers for universities that are getting into the distance 
learning business.  Garon believes 75% is a conservative 
estimate of the proportion of two-year and four-year colleges 
engaged in online courses.49  Another oft-quoted statistic is that 
“in 2002, it is estimated that 2.2 million college students—15% 
of all higher education students—will take distance learning 

file. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Garon, supra note 35, at 147 (citing Sarah Parkin, Adults Tap Into 
Web for College Big Time, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 2000, at 8). 
 46. Id. at 148.  See supra note 41, for a list of Fathom participants. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (citing Donald MacLeod, Higher Education: e for East End: Donald 
MacLeod Finds a Global Consortium Offering London History as One of its 
Short Courses Online, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 2002, at 15, and Jennifer 
Medina, Despite School Closing, Online Colleges Beckon: Cyberspace Market 
Expected to Grow, BOSTON GLOBE, August 5, 2001, at B9). 
 49. Id. at 147.  See also Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An 
Analysis of University Claims to Faculty Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (citing 
U.S. Copyright Office, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE 
EDUCATION 10, 19 (1999) (citing International Data Corp., Distance Learning 
Takes Off, Fueled by Growth in Internet Access, (Press Release, Feb. 2, 1999)), 
http://www.idc.com/Data/Consumer/content/CSB020999PR.htm) (This link is 
no longer active.). 
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courses.”50 
On the other side is university and faculty concern over the 
unauthorized commercialization of faculty lecture notes, a 
problem California considered serious enough to pass 
legislation prohibiting unauthorized sale to commercial note-
taking companies like Versity.com, Study24-7.com, 
Studyaid.com, and StudentU.com.51  None of these sites were 
still operating as of October 2002, perhaps because of the lack 
of profitability or efforts like Yale’s cease and desist letters.52 
All three arenas of intellectual property—from patents in 
the sciences, profits from trademarks on university 
merchandise and sports, and from copyrights, the potential 
markets for distance learning and other copyrighted works 
from the classroom—are deeply impacting how the university 
looks at intellectual property.  The story is also more complex, 
particularly with copyrighted works, on which the rest of this 
article focuses.  First, the laws governing copyright are giving 
universities a new opportunity to claim ownership on 
previously designated teacher-owned materials.  Second, 
universities began drafting policies that took advantage of this 
change, putting universities at greater advantage if there were 
potential profits.  The heart of this essay explores the evolution 
of these changes, looking specifically at case law, legislative 
history, and finally, current university intellectual property 
policies.  Before embarking on this journey, however, some 
readers may need to understand a few copyright basics within 
the university setting. 

 50. Packard, supra note 49. 
 51. Lecture Notes Will Protect Students from Illegitimate Services, DAILY 
CALIFORNIAN, September 28, 2000, available from Lexis, University News 
library, University Wire file; Sharon Jayson, Online Notes Debate; College 
Lecturers Split over Propriety of Free, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, March 
26, 2000 at B1 (“StudentU.com has 1,300 notetakers on more than 80 
campuses.  Study24-7.com claims a presence at more than 300 colleges and 
universities through the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.”) 
 52. Stephane L. Seeley, Note, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by 
Copyright Laws? The Case for Professors’ Intellectual Property Rights, 51 
SYRACUSE L.REV. 163, 165 (citing Ambika Kumar, Duke U: Universities Fight 
Online Notes Phenomenon, THE CHRONICLE  (Duke University), Sept. 7, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 24492307). 
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II. BASICS OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNIVERSITY 
SETTING 
A. CREATING COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
Copyright surrounds the activities of teachers and scholars 
on an everyday basis.  For example, a teacher creates a test for 
a class.  Is the test copyrightable, what makes it copyrightable, 
and how does it become copyrightable?  The answer depends on 
a number of legal factors found in the 1976 US Copyright Act, a 
federal statute passed by Congress and interpreted by case law.  
Copyright gives the copyright holder exclusive rights to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform, 
display publicly, transfer ownership, license, or lend the 
original work of authorship.53  For instance, only the copyright 
holder of John Barthe’s novel The Sot-Weed Factor can 
authorize someone to make new editions or translations, make 
t-shirts with long quotes from The Sot-Weed Factor, or create 
and perform a musical version based on the novel The Sot-Weed 
Factor.54  The Copyright Act protects the exclusive economic 
interests of the copyright holder.55  Copyrightable works for 
teachers and scholars include lecture notes created for a course, 
websites created for courses, exam questions, syllabi, drafts 
and final versions of articles, dissertations, theses, and 
monographs—all of the materials that scholars create and with 
which teachers teach. 
To be copyrightable, a work must have some modicum of 
original creativity and be in a fixed, tangible form.56  The 
creativity threshold is low, but important.57  For example, a 

 53. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106, Public Law 94-553, 90 Stat. 
2541, as amended through July 1, 1999. 
 54. See JOHN BARTHE, THE SOT-WEED FACTOR (1967). 
 55. 17 U.S.C., § 106. 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a). 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . 
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes 
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; 
and (8) architectural works. 
Id. 
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a).  The originality requirement is easy to meet, 
requiring only “a slight amount [of originality to] suffice.”  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
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multiple choice or essay test would, in most circumstances, 
meet the two requirements.  However, if a teacher prepares an 
answer sheet that has the student circle either the “T” or the 
“F” for twenty-five questions, in all likelihood the answer sheet 
would not be copyrightable, because two columns with “T” and 
“F” in them would not meet the minimum qualifications for 
creativity or originality.58  The policy behind this makes sense: 
if one teacher owned the copyright on that type of answer 
sheet, that one teacher could prevent everyone else from using 
that form, because having a copyright allows the owner to 
control the reproduction and distribution of the work, the 
creation of derivative works, the distribution of copies, and the 
public performance of the work.59  A copyright does not protect 
the ideas within a work, but protects the expression of the 
work, a distinction commonly known as the idea-expression 
dichotomy.  In an essay test, the phrasing and language—the 
art of creation—is protected; the facts and ideas expressed are 
not.60  Someone else could read the test, and use the same main 
ideas for another test without infringing.  It is when the 
expression of those ideas begin to resemble too closely the 
original that infringement occurs. 
Lectures can pose a problem regarding the “fixed” 
requirement in copyright.61  Lectures have traditionally been 
given before a live audience.  To copyright a lecture, the lecture 
must be in a tangible, fixed form.62  If a professor writes her 
lecture in a word processing program, or creates an outline or 
notes, those written versions of the lecture are protected by 
copyright.63  Audio or video recording could also fix the lecture.64  
If a professor authorizes students to tape-record their lectures, 
the tape recording fixes the lecture sufficiently to establish 
copyright on the live version.65  However, the permission in 

 58. Id. 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 61. Interestingly, courts (pre-1976 Copyright Act) had given ownership of 
lectures to the lecturer (apart from the fixed in a tangible form requirement). 
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a). 
 63. These lecture notes, as unpublished works, are still protected by 
statutory copyright.  The copyright begins from the moment of creation and 
lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years. 
 64. Id., see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6). 
 65. Interestingly, it was with lectures that the issue of whether teachers 
 2003] DISAPPEARING TEACHER EXCEPTION 223 
 
making the copy does not transfer any kind of ownership rights 
in the copyright to the student.66  The rights to reproduce, 
distribute, and publicly perform that lecture elsewhere remain 
with the professor.67  The student has ownership of the tape 
itself, not the legal intellectual property rights surrounding the 
content on the tape.68  Issues of ownership in lecture came into 
focus early in legal history when someone in the audience tried 
to publish notes from the lecture.  As this article will show, 
courts have given the right to control lecture and professionally 
created lecture notes to the professor, not the university; 
however, the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent case law are 
quickly eroding long-established traditions.69 
The question here is one of control.  Traditionally, scholars 
and teachers have had ownership—or control—over materials 
they create.70  With a shift in ownership to the university, 
however, scholars and teachers will no longer control their 
creative product, which is bound to affect the nature of the 
profession.  One can quickly see that works not economically 
valuable in an analog, live-classroom world may have great 
economic value in a digital age.  In particular, the game may 
become entirely different when the classroom is transformed in 
a digital age.  Does the teacher own the materials prepared for 

own their materials began.  The question was whether a student or audience 
member could print the notes from the lecture; courts, in the past, have found 
that the lecturer holds the copyright in the lecture, and not those jotting down 
notes; see Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. App. 1969). 
 66. See 17 U.S.C. § 202, “Ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from 
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”  One might 
consider making a condition of taping the lecture the transfer of the tapes to 
the instructor once the course is completed.  Then the instructor would have a 
copy of her lectures without much fuss and would establish copyright in the 
lectures if the issue arose at a later time. 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 202, discussing ownership of copyright as distinct from 
ownership of a material object. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Today, however, new areas are arising concerning lectures, where 
third parties are marketing course notes.  UCLA is one school that has filed 
lawsuits to protect the lectures, calling into question, of course, whether 
UCLA is claiming ownership in the lectures themselves.  See Jonathan Alger, 
Classroom Capitalism,  ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 2000, available at 
http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/00jf/JF00LgWa.htm. (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2002).  See also University of Texas, Ownership of Lectures: 
Commercial Notetaking in University Courses, available at 
http://utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/lectures.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 
2002) (claiming lecture materials are the property of faculty; therefore, the 
university will not file infringement suits). 
 70. See infra Part II.B. 
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the course, or does the university?  Are the materials prepared 
for teaching owned by the university as part of the employment 
contract, or are they separate, creative creations of the 
individual teacher?  Who profits from lecture notes, 
transparencies, tests, and web sites? 
However, one need not go to the digital age to confront 
problems.  For example, there are thousands of adjunct 
professors.  What do they own?  As they move nomadically from 
university to university, what is theirs to use again, and what 
must they leave behind at the university that hired them for 
only one semester?  What about a professor who moves to a 
different university, or graduate students working as teaching 
assistants, or part-time lecturers?  It is all a question of who 
owns the copyright, and the ideas about ownership are quickly 
changing. 
B. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP BASICS 
“No one sells or mortgages all the products of his brain 
to his employer by the mere fact of employment.”71 
Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, (D.D.C. 1959) 
Ownership has become complicated in the university 
realm.  Previously, teachers owned their scholarly works as an 
exception to the work-for-hire doctrine under the 1909 
Copyright Act.  This was judge-made law, rather than part of 
the 1909 statute.  To understand what the teacher exception 
means today requires an understanding of the ownership 
schemes available under the Copyright Act of 1976.  Three 
basic types of ownership exist: author as owner, employer as 
owner under a work-for-hire doctrine, and employer as owner of 
a commissioned work by an independent contractor.  The 
following will briefly explain the basics of all three. 
Ownership of copyrighted works is sometimes separate 
from authorship.72  Normally, the creator of the work is also the 

 71. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
5.03[B][1][b][i] (2002) (citing Pub. Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 
601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 
vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962)) (italics added). 
 72. Garon, supra note 35 at n.72. 
The assignment of authorship is distinct from the assignment of the 
copyright.  Any author may transfer his or her copyright at any time, 
but the assignment of copyright will be a narrower grant than the 
assignment of authorship, because the author retains certain rights to 
termination of a copyright assignment that are extinguished if the 
work is made pursuant to a work for hire relationship. 
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owner, giving the creator of the work all of the rights afforded a 
copyright owner.73  Under the current copyright act, this means 
that the copyrighted work is protected for seventy years past 
the author’s life.74  If professors own their works under this 
scenario, the university has no claim of ownership. 
Employers own the work if creation of the work falls under 
the scope of employment.75  The Supreme Court, in Community 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (hereinafter CCNV v. Reid), 
determined what constitutes employment for purposes of work-
for-hire requirements. 76  This case is discussed later in this 
article.  For now, it is sufficient to understand that most works 
of full-time teachers and faculty fall under the work-for-hire 
requirements.  The 1976 Act did not codify this judge-made 
“teacher exception” as part of the statute thus its survival 
today is uncertain.77 
Finally, a work-for-hire can be commissioned from an 
independent contractor.78  This, too, will be discussed in more 
detail, but many activities in which teachers engage, including 
creating instructional texts, translations, and supplemental 
works, fall under this category.79  In both instances, specific 
requirements must be met before the exception will apply.  
That a work is commissioned, or someone works at a job, does 
not necessarily mean that the employer owns the work created. 
III.UNRAVELING THE “TEACHER EXCEPTION” 
Traditionally, case law and custom has dictated a “teacher 
exception,” where scholars/teachers have owned the materials 
they create, despite traditional work-for-hire doctrine under 
which the employer would be considered the work’s creator.  
This is well-trodden territory.  Many law reviews have explored 
the development of the teacher exception and its current 

Id. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
 74. One strategy suggested is joint authorship, which gives each party the 
rights associated with copyright.  To be considered a work of joint authorship 
all of the authors involved in the preparation and ownership, contributed to 
the work “with the intention that their contributions be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”  17. U.S.C. § 101. 
 75. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[A]. 
 76. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 460 U.S. 730 (1989) 
 77. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 78. See infra Part III.A.2 of this article, discussing Williams v. Weisser, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. 1969). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
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demise.  The teacher exception was established under the 1909 
act by case law, but because the 1976 act did not incorporate it, 
the “teacher exception” was subsumed by a work-for-hire 
doctrine that the Supreme Court’s definition of employment in 
CCVN v. Reid places teachers’ materials under the scope of 
employment.80  Thus the university-employers own their 
original creative works.81  No court has decided whether the 
“teacher exception” survived Reid, but the Seventh Circuit in 
Weinstein, decided two years before Reid, had already 
transferred the “teacher exception” from a case-based judge-
made law to one dictated by university policy.82  The university 
chose to claim or disclaim ownership in traditional materials 
produced in teaching, research, and study.83  All of this is dealt 
with in more detail below and is part of the argument 
surrounding the demise of the “teacher exception.” 
This section looks at the issue of the “teacher exception” 
from a slightly different historical perspective by placing the 
“teacher exception” cases of Williams,84 Weinstein, and Hayes85 
alongside the legislative testimony of scholars and their 
concerns during the Copyright Act revisions during the 1960s 
and 1970s.86  One of the main arguments for the disappearance 
of the “teacher exception” was its non-incorporation into the 
1976 Copyright Act, suggesting that Congress had not intended 
the “teacher exception” to survive.  This article argues, on the 
contrary, that the “teacher exception” was so well established 
that no one thought it was in danger under the 1976 Act.  This 
idea is supported in Judge Posner’s dicta opinion in Hayes,87 
delivered one year after the Weinstein court gave universities 
power over the fate of the “teacher exception.”  To date, no law 
review article has actually explored Posner’s assertion within 
the context of the copyright law revisions. 

 80. 460 U.S. at 730. 
 81. Numerous law review articles have pondered the implication of the 
Supreme Court’s “teacher exception” in Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid.  Some have taken the position that the Court’s definition of employment 
includes teachers and scholars, and therefore, subsumes the “teacher 
exception.”  Others follow tradition and have argued that, like the 1909 Act 
(which defined work-for-hire with a factors test and then by case law), the 
definition of employment excludes teachers.  See generally supra note 52. 
 82. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 83. This section will discuss Weinstein and related cases in detail. 
 84. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. 1969). 
 85. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 86. See infra note 171. 
 87. See infra text accompanying notes 171-175. 
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A. THE CASE AGAINST THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE “TEACHER 
EXCEPTION.” 
The revision of the Copyright Act did not happen 
overnight.  Revisions were introduced in Congress as early as 
1924.88  It would not be until 1955 that the revision process was 
begun seriously, heating up from 1961 to 1964.89  Draft 
copyright bills were introduced in 1964, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973, 
and 1974.90  Finally, after a hearing with over a hundred 
witnesses in 1975 and more revisions, the 1976 Copyright Act 
was passed by a 97-0 Senate vote on February 19, 1976.91  The 
following parts of this article examine the “teacher exception” 
during this time. 
1. The 1967 Senate Hearing on the Copyright Law Revision 
In light of the proposed revisions in the 1960s, the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on 
Copyright Law Revision was formed.  It consisted of 34 
associations representing educational interests from 
elementary through higher education, public, private, and 
parochial schools.92  On March 16, 1967, nine witnesses from 
this committee appeared before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee 
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee of 
the Judiciary to express their concerns about the proposed 
Copyright Law Revisions currently being debated.93  They 
detailed, through written and oral statements, and question 
and answer sessions with the senators, the main concerns of 
educators.94  The “teacher exception” regarding ownership was 
not mentioned.  The best explanation of why it was not 
mentioned is that none of the testifying witnesses believed the 
exception was at issue.  The support for this supposition is 
circumstantial, but important.  Witnesses detailed a myriad of 
educators’ concerns regarding the revision and the fact that the 
“teacher exception” was not part of this list is evidence that it 

 88. 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
Appendix 4 (2002) (reprinting “The House Report on the Copyright Act of 
1976” as corrected in 122 Cong. Rec. H 10727-8 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
90th Cong. 141, 151 (1967) (hereinafter Copyright Law Revision). 
 93. Id. at 141. 
 94. Id. 
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was not at issue.  The concerns of the day in 1967 shed some 
light on why the “teacher exception” might not have been at 
issue. 
The ad hoc committee of educators, represented by the nine 
witnesses, had been studying the proposed copyright revisions 
for three years, and their concerns represented their 
recommendations to the Senate on the currently proposed bill.95  
Many aspects of the Senate revisions were revolutionary.  Some 
testifying educators touched upon these revolutionary concepts 
in their statements.  New technologies like the photocopier 
drove some of their concerns.96  Substantive changes to the 
copyright law itself presented other issues, including the 
change in length of duration of copyright, and the development 
of the statutory category of fair use.97 
According to Dr. Wigren, chairman of the ad hoc 
committee, the latest bill contained marked improvements for 
education, but changes were still needed, and level of concern 
was still high.98  Dr. Wigren outlined “six fundamental needs of 
education which must be protected in any revision of the 
copyright law.”99  These needs reflected the educators’ response 
to the proposed bill, rather than all copyright needs of 
educators.  Their concerns included: 
(1) the need for teachers to make limited copies of copyright materials 
for classroom use; (2) the need to have “fair use” extended to include 
educational broadcasting and educational uses of computers; (3) the 
need for reasonable certainty that a given use of copyrighted 
materials is permissible; (4) the need for protection in the event 
teachers and librarians innocently infringe the law; (5) the need to 
meet future instructional requirements by utilizing the new 
educational technology now being made available to schools; and (6) 
the need to have ready access to materials.
100
 
What is striking about these needs is the focus on 
educators as copyright users, rather than producers.  None of 
their concerns focused on ownership of materials created by 
teachers.  The far-reaching issues at hand included formulating 
a statutory fair use doctrine and extending copyright durations.  

 95. Copyright Law Revision, supra note 92 at 142. 
 96. For more on historical development of copyright law and the influence 
of technology, see generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 37 (1994) and more recently, Mark F. 
Smith, Intellectual Property and the AAUP, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 39. 
 97. See generally, Copyright Law Revision, supra note 92, at 152-54. 
 98. Id at 143. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 152-54. 
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Regarding duration: under the proposed laws, materials that 
had previously entered the public domain after twenty-eight 
years because of non-renewal would now automatically be 
protected for the life of the author plus seventy years.101  This 
would severely hamper educators’ use of materials previously 
considered abandoned.102  If educators were concerned about 
duration and other similarly grave issues, it follows that if the 
“teacher exception” had been in danger, it would have been 
brought up as a seventh point.  But it does not appear to have 
been an issue at that time.  Furthermore, the educator’s 
requests, according to Senator McClellan, were “a pretty big 
order.”103 
Even so, one can see that the language of their concerns 
replicates the “teacher exception” in that they saw the role of 
educators as special and unique: 
We feel we must bring these matters to your concern, because 
teachers do not use materials for their own private individual gain.  
They use materials for the benefit of your children and the benefit of 
the children of all of our citizens.  We have a responsibility that we 
cannot dismiss lightly in seeing to it that children have access to 
communication of ideas in our society . . . . We want to reemphasize 
again so that you can keep this uppermost in your mind that we are 
stressing the public interest in our statement here.  This is our point, 
because we are in the business of serving the public.”
104
 
Dr. Lois Edinger, a former classroom teacher from North 
Carolina, and then an associate professor of education at 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, reiterated the 
special place of teachers in describing the function of the 
National Education Association (NEA): “NEA has two primary 
interests: the improvement of instruction in the Nation’s 

 101. Id. at 147. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id at 163. 
 104. Id at 149. In his prepared statement, Dr. Wigren also quoted the label 
under the Library of Congress’ display case containing a copy of the Gutenberg 
Bible: “Through the invention of printing, it became possible for the 
accumulated knowledge of the human race to become the common property of 
every man who knew how to read—an immense forward step in the 
emancipation of the human mind.”  Id at 151.  Dr. Wigren continued: 
This sums up in a succinct way the point of view and concern which 
our Ad Hoc Committee wishes to express to the Congress in regard to 
revision of the copyright law.  Our committee is speaking on behalf of 
the public interest—the right of every man to share in the 
accumulated knowledge of the human race, and the rights and 
responsibilities of teachers to make the knowledge available in the 
public interest. 
Id. 
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schools and the protection of the rights of teachers and their 
welfare.  Both of these interests are affected by any revision of 
the copyright law.”105 
Two other pieces of historical material support this: the 
development of the ad hoc committee itself, and its resolution 
three years later: 
Because education has a substantial interest in the copyright law, the 
NEA through its division of audiovisual instructional service and its 
national commission on professional rights and responsibilities, in 
July 1963, called a national conference of representative of major 
education organizations to discuss both the present copyright law and 
the proposals which were being made for revision of the law; to 
canvass education’s needs in a new copyright law; and to determine 




A statement of their concern was adopted in July 1966 at 
the NEA’s annual meeting in Miami Beach, Florida.107  The 
1967 list is said to represent these concerns.  Dr. Edinger 
explained to the Senate: “Let me simply say as a summary of 
that resolution that there are two parallel sets of rights—the 
rights of those who create materials, and the rights of 
educators to use certain copyrighted materials in teaching.”108  
Note, that there is an implication that the materials being 
created are those other than the educators’.  That educators 
might create economically valuable copyrighted materials was 
not yet a concern.109 
2. The 1969 “Teacher Exception” Case of Williams v. Weisser110 
In the midst of continuing discussions on the revisions of 
the copyright law, a California case concerning the 
unauthorized commercial sale and distribution of notes taken 
at a UCLA anthropology professor’s lectures wrestled with the 
issue of ownership and the “teacher exception.”111  While the 
substantive matter of the case is often discussed in law review 
articles, the point here is that the concept of the “teacher 
exception” was decided in the courts while educators and 

 105. Id. 
 106. Id at 158 (statement of Dr. Lois Edinger, representing the classroom 
teacher uses of copyrighted materials). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See e.g., Alger, supra note 69 (examining third party sales of 
university lecture course notes). 
 110. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
 111. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
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legislators were debating the revisions.  The “teacher 
exception” did not become a concern of educators even after the 
Williams case.112  In all probability, this is because the “teacher 
exception” appeared to be decided case law after the Williams 
case. 
The Williams case concerned a for-profit company that 
paid students to take lecture notes, which the company then 
sold to students taking the class.113  The court found that the 
professor, rather than the university, had a common law 
copyright in his lectures.114  The court explained that a 
professor was hired to teach a certain body of material—the 
Renaissance or Shakespeare—rather than to present a certain, 
dictated expression of that material.115  The court differentiated 
“other products of the mind which an employee is hired to 
create,” from the lectures conducted by a professor.116  “[I]n 
order to determine just what it is getting, the university would 
have to find out the precise extent to which a professor’s 
lectures have taken concrete shape when he first comes to 
work,” which the court thought undesirable and most likely 
impossible.117 
To get to this view, the Williams court cited a number of 
leading English cases, among them Abernethy v. Hutchinson.118  
In that case, Dr. Abernethy delivered lectures based on his own 
notes at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital in London.119  The 
defendant periodical, “The Lancet,” published the lectures.120  

 112. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 113. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
 114. Id. at 545.  Under the 1909 Act, unpublished works had a common law 
copyright; only upon publication did works come under the federal copyright 
statute.  That changed with the 1976 Copyright Act, where unpublished and 
published works receive the same term of protection, seventy years after the 
author’s death.  See also Consortium for Educational Technology for 
University Systems, infra note 214 at 11. 
 115. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 546.  The court declared that “rule[s] of law developed in one 
context should not be blindly applied in another where it violates the intention 
of the parties and creates undesirable consequences.  University lectures are 
sui generis.”  Id. at 546-47.  The court further stressed that “[a]bsent 
compulsion by state or precedent, university lectures should not be blindly 
thrown into the same legal hopper with valve designs, motion picture 
background music, commercial drawings, . . . and treatises on the use of ozone 
or on larceny and homicide.”  Id. (internal cites omitted). 
 118. Id. at 547 (referring to 3 L.J. (ch.) 209 (1825)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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In granting an injunction, Lord Eldon compared Dr. 
Abernethy’s role at the hospital to that of a professor.121  The 
Williams court reasoned that since in “absence of positive 
evidence to the contrary the [Abernethy court] assumed as a 
matter of course that the copyright was with the lecturer and 
not with the hospital,” the copyright would not belong to a 
university either.122  Lord Eldon had assumed that professors 
had a common law copyright in their lectures, due to Sir 
William Blackstone’s copyright in his Vinerian Lectures.123 
Now, if a professor be appointed, he is appointed for the purpose of 
giving information to all the students who attend him, and it is his 
duty to do that; but I have never yet heard that any body could 
publish his lectures; nor can I conceive on what ground Sir William 
Blackstone had the copyright in his [Vinerian Lectures] for twenty 
years, if there had been such a right as that; we used to take notes at 
his lectures; at Sir Robert Chamber’s lectures also the students used 
to take notes; but it never was understood that those lectures could be 
published;—and so with respect to any other lectures in the 
university, it was the duty of certain persons to give those lectures 
but it never was understood, that the lectures were capable of being 
published by any of the persons who heard them.
124
 
The Williams court also looked at Caird v. Sime.125  
Defendant had published pamphlets of plaintiff professor’s 
lectures based on notes taken at the lecture.126  “In law the case 
turned on the question whether Caird had lost his common law 
copyright because as a professor in a public university it was 
his obligation ‘to receive into his class all comers having the 
requisite qualification,’” thereby making his lectures 
“addressed to the public.”127  The Caird court dismissed this 
argument and responded, as the Abernethy court had, that the 
lectures were held in copyright by the professor.128 
As to cases in the United States, the Williams court 
discussed Sherrill v. Grieves,129 where plaintiff professor at an 
army officer’s school wrote a book in conjunction with the 
course he was teaching to “fill the gap” of material he wanted 

 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at n. 7 (quoting Abernethy, 3 L.J. at 215). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 12 A. C. 326 (H.L. 1887). 
 126. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 548. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 57 Wash. L.R. 286, 20 C.O. Bull. 675. 
 2003] DISAPPEARING TEACHER EXCEPTION 233 
 
the students to learn.130  He gave permission to the school to 
print a portion of the book before the complete book was 
published.131  Defendants claimed that plaintiff professor’s book 
was a publication of the United States, and therefore in the 
public domain.132  The Sherrill court found that the professor 
was employed to lecture, not to write a book.133 
The plaintiff at the time was employed to give instruction just as a 
professor in an institution of learning is employed.  The court does not 
know of any authority holding that such a professor is obliged to 
reduce his lectures to writing or if he does so that they become the 
property of the institution employing him.
134
 
Just because the government used the book with 
permission did not automatically transfer or assign the 
copyright from the plaintiff professor to the institution.135 
Finally, the Williams court explained: “No reason has been 
suggested why a university would want to retain ownership in 
a professor’s expression.  Such retention would be useless 
except possibly . . . for making it difficult for the teacher to give 
the same lectures, should he change jobs.”136  It would be 
difficult because, if the university owned the material, they 
would also control it and its future uses, including prohibiting 
its creator, the professor, from giving the same lecture 
elsewhere. 
3. The 1975 Congressional Hearings 
Nearly ten years after the first hearings, in 1967, the 
House of Representatives heard further testimony on the 
Copyright Law revisions.137  Again, Dr. Harold Wigren and 
three others appeared, including Sheldon E. Steinbach, the 
then current chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Education 

 130. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 548. 
 131. Id. 
 132. “No copyright may be claimed in a work written in a for-hire 
relationship if the employer is the United States Government,” NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[A] at 5-11 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 105).  Nimmer 
notes a “broader construction of works for hire in suits against the U.S. 
Government.”  Id. n.7. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 549 (alteration in original) (quoting Sherrill, 20 C.O. Bull. 675). 
 135. See Id. 
 136. Id. at 546. 
 137. Copyright Law Revision, May 15, 1975: Hearing on H.R. 2223 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 267 (1976). 
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Organizations on Copyright Law Revision.138  The committee 
had now grown to thirty-nine organizations, “represent[ing] the 
interests of teachers, professors, school and college 
administrators, subject matter specialists, educational 
broadcasters, librarians, and indirectly, students 
themselves.”139  As in the 1967 Senate hearing, educators raised 
their concerns, but again the “teacher exception” was never 
mentioned.  This time, both research and teaching were 
emphasized: “each function is indispensable to and supportive 
of the other.”140  However, the fair use provisions in the most 
recent bill were the main focus of concern.141 
4. The relationship of the 1909 Act to the 1976 Act 
The “teacher exception” was devised under the 1909 Act,142 
and affirmed by the Williams case.143  However, whether the 
“teacher exception” survived the 1976 Act was questionable.  In 
working out the parameters of the work-for-hire doctrine, one 
1984 case which has not received much attention, is useful.  In 
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,144 the Second Circuit 
stated, “[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended to dispense with [the 
standards from the 1909 Act work-for-hire doctrine].”145  
Nimmer commented, “the Second Circuit concluded from 
legislative silence that no change was intended.”146  However, 
“the Supreme Court rejected such reliance on legislative 
silence,” explaining “Congress’ silence is just that—silence.”147  
What this means when applied to the “teacher exception” is 
that silence can be taken for silence and need not indicate 
exclusion under the new work-for-hire doctrine. 

 138. Id. at 268. 
 139. Id. (testimony of Sheldon E. Steinbach, staff counsel, American 
Council on Education and Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of Education 
Organizations on Copyright Law Revision). 
 140. Id at 270. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See discussion supra Part III. 
 143. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 144. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 145. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71 § 5.03[B][1][a] n.37 at 5-17 
(quoting Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
749 (1989)). 
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5. The mid-1980’s Seventh Circuit Pair of “Teacher Exception” 
cases 
Over a decade after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
two cases from the Seventh Circuit took up the issue of the 
“teacher exception.”  One case dramatically altered it, while the 
other reaffirmed the exception in dicta.  Weinstein v. University 
of Illinois and Hays v. Sony Corp. of America both discussed the 
question of whether the “teacher exception” remained under 
the new work-for-hire doctrine under the 1976 Copyright Act.148  
Since no “teacher exception” cases have been decided since 
before Reid, which defined the scope of the work-for-hire 
doctrine,149 these cases are important in understanding the 
status of the “teacher exception” today. 
The Weinstein case evaluated the 1976 Copyright Act 
work-for-hire doctrine with regard to professors and teachers.150  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the policy behind 
the “teacher exception.”151  However, the court based its 
reasoning on university policies (coupled with tradition) rather 
than case law.152  Furthermore, the court seemed to hold open 
the possibility that universities could change their policies with 
justification, and include scholars’ writings under the work-for-
hire doctrine.153  The following year, the Hays case, in dicta, 
seemed to reaffirm that a “teacher exception” exists, for all the 
traditional reasons given under the 1909 case law.154  Whether 
this serves as a contrast or a clarification to Weinstein is not 
clear from the opinions themselves, which are discussed in 
detail below. 
The Weinstein district court found that the university 
owned an article because the document constituted a work-for-
hire;155 the appellate court disagreed.156  Three professors 

 148. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987); and Hays v. 
Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 149. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 150. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1091. 
 151. Id. at 1094. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 155. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  The 
dispute centered around which author’s name should be listed first, with 
Weinstein alleging denial of due process under the 14th Amendment.  Id.  The 
district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, concluding that the employer owned the 
article as a “work-for-hire,” and therefore Weinstein had no standing to sue.  
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involved in a university-funded program wrote the article about 
the program’s results.157  Judge Easterbrook wrote the opinion 
for the panel, which included Judges Cudahy and Posner, and 
explained that “[t]he copyright law gives an employer the full 
rights in an employee’s ‘work for hire’ . . . unless a contract 
provides otherwise.  The statute is general enough to make 
every academic article a ‘work for hire’ and therefore vest 
exclusive control in universities rather than scholars.”158  The 
court noted that many academic institutions responded to the 
Act “by adopting a policy defining ‘work for hire’ for purposes of 
[their] employees, including [their] professors.”159  For example, 
the University of Illinois, the institution in question, includes 
the following definition of a “work-for-hire” in each of its 
professor’s employment contracts: 
[A] professor retains the copyright unless the work falls into one of 
three categories: 1) [t]he terms of a University agreement with an 
external party require the University to hold or transfer ownership in 
the copyrightable work, or 2) [w]orks expressly commissioned in 
writing by the University, or 3) [w]orks created as a specific 
requirement of employment or as an assigned University duty.160 
According to the appeals court, the district court found the 
article to fall under the third category because the University 
funded the program, and “because, as a clinical professor, 
Weinstein was required to conduct and write about clinical 
programs.”161  Easterbrook found this interpretation to “collide[] 
with the role of the three categories as exceptions to a rule that 
faculty members own the copyrights in their academic work.”162  
Easterbrook explained that universities require all of their 
scholars to write as part of the tenure process.163  “When Dean 
Manasse told Weinstein to publish or perish, he was not 
simultaneously claiming for the University a copyright on the 
ground that the work had become a ‘requirement of duty’ 
within the meaning of [the third work-for-hire definition].”164  
Easterbrook exalted the practice that academics have held the 

Id. at 865. 
 156. Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 157. Id. at 1092-93. 
 158. Id. at 1093-94. 
 159. Id at 1094. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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copyright to their scholarly works, averring “[w]hen Saul 
Bellow, a professor at University of Chicago, writes a novel, he 
may keep the royalties.”165  Easterbrook further notes that this 
practice is “a tradition the University’s policy purports to 
retain.  The tradition covers scholarly articles and other 
intellectual property.”166  As further evidence, Easterbrook 
notes that the University never acted as if it owned the 
copyright.  Weinstein did not need permission from the 
University to publish the article, a requirement if the 
University had indeed been the copyright holder.167  
Easterbrook’s last point is very interesting: a university’s claim 
of ownership comes with additional responsibilities, 
responsibilities most universities have yet to accommodate 
with structural and financial support.  It also speaks to the 
control issue,168 suggesting that, in the coming years, groups 
like the American Association of University Professors should 
remain vocal in getting out the message that with ownership 
comes control of determining content, dissemination, and 
publication. 
Easterbrook explained that the University’s claim on 
copyright focused more on administrative duties, such as a 
university committee report.169  What is interesting is that 
Easterbrook leaves the door open to changing tradition: “We do 
not say that a broader reading is impossible, but such a reading 
should be established by evidence about the deliberations 
underlying the policy and the course of practice.”170 

 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  Easterbrook also cites Nimmer : “This has been the academic 
tradition since copyright law began, see M. Nimmer, Copyright § 5.03[B][1][b] 
(1978 ed.), a tradition the University’s policy purports to retain.”  Id. 
 167. Id. at 1095. 
 168. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 169. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094. 
 170. Id. at 1094.  Todd Borow points out that the Weinstein court relied on 
the Ninth Circuit case May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 
(9th Cir. 1980).  Todd A. Borow, Copyright Ownership of Scholarly Works 
Created by University Faculty and Posted on School-Provided Web Pages, 7 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 156 (1998).  The court used May’s holding of 
“incorporat[ing] professional custom into . . . disputed contract[s], by bringing 
academic tradition into the copyright agreement.”  Id.  “In the case of May v. 
Morganelli-Heumman & Associates, the Ninth Circuit stated that if a practice 
is known to the parties or widely held, ‘the custom is an implied in fact term of 
the contract’ between the parties.”  Id at 156.  Borow further notes: 
The Weinstein court appears to have stretched the May holding, 
because while May relied on custom in usage in the absence of any 
specific mention of an agreement to that custom, Weinstein looked to 
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The Hays case, decided a year after Weinstein, continued 
the discussion.  Two high school teachers sued Sony Corp. for 
copying (in some places verbatim) the word processor operating 
manual they as teachers wrote for their students.171  The 
teachers’ employer had given the manual to Sony.172  Sony, 
after copying and modifying the manual to suit their word 
processor, delivered it to the school district.173  The court 
discussed the “work-for-hire” doctrine in dicta in the opinion.174  
The decision was written by Judge Posner, with Flaum and 
Easterbrook on the panel.175  In some ways, then, this case can 
be seen as continuing the discussion begun the year before in 
Weinstein. 
Judge Posner explained that “[u]ntil 1976, the statutory 
term ‘work made for hire’ was not defined, and some courts had 
adopted a ‘teacher exception’ whereby academic writing was 
presumed not to be work made for hire.”176  Posner explained 
that the “authority for this conclusion was in fact scanty . . . not 
because the merit of the exception was doubted, but because, on 
the contrary, virtually no one questioned that the academic 
author was entitled to copyright his writings.”177  He reiterated 
the traditional reasons, that although academics use their 
“employer’s paper, copier, secretarial staff, and (often) 
computer facilities” as part of their employment, “[a] college or 
university does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of 
academic books and articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit 
their writings, whether through publication or otherwise.”178  
He noted that he did not include in this category material that 
a school directly requested a teacher to prepare, and then 
directed other teachers to use.179 
What is interesting about his analysis is the fact that only 

academic tradition in spite of a specific provision dealing with the 
vesting of copyrights that contradicted the academic tradition. 
Id. at 156-57 (citing Michael J. Luzman and Daniel S. Pupel, Jr., Weinstein v. 
University of Illinois: The “Work-for-Hire” Doctrine and Procedural Due 
Process for Nontenured Faculty, 15 J.C. & U.L. 369, 375 (1989). 
 171. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 416-17. 
 175. Id. at 413.  Note: Easterbrook wrote the Weinstein opinion, with 
Posner on the panel. 
 176. 847 F.2d at 416. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
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thirteen years after Posner’s assumptions that a college or 
university is “poorly equipped to exploit their writings”, much 
has changed, or is about to change.  The rise of technology 
transfer and trademark licensing offices within universities has 
greatly changed this equation, yet to date they have not focused 
on copyrighted works.  Also note that in this exception, two 
elements are required: the school must directly request the 
teacher to prepare the material and the school must then direct 
other teachers to use the materials. 
Posner then directly addressed whether the 1976 act 
abolished the “teacher exception,” as many had believed.  He 
did not believe it had, “for there is no discussion of the issue in 
the legislative history, and no political or other reasons come to 
mind as to why Congress might have wanted to abolish the 
exception.”180  He continued: 
[t]o a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that the Act 
abolished the exception may seem inescapable.  The argument would 
be that academic writing, being within the scope of academic 
employment, is work made for hire, per se; so, in the absence of an 
express written and signed wavier of the academic employer’s rights, 
the copyright in such writing must belong to the employer.
181
 
Posner explains this literalist reading would wreak havoc 
“in the settled practices of academic institutions.”182  He thinks, 
if forced to decide (which he is not, since this discussion is 
dicta), that a reading of the statute in support of a “teacher 
exception” could be found in the fact that a work-for-hire has to 
be “prepared for the employer.”183  With regard to the Hays case 
itself, Posner explains that high school teachers are not 
required to publish as part of their job requirement and 
therefore this work falls outside the scope of their employment, 
“especially since, so far as appears, they prepared the manual 
on their own initiative without direction or supervision by their 
superiors.”184 
Easterbrook’s decision in Weinstein appears to stand as the 
only voice on this topic, meaning that university policies control 
whether a “teacher exception” exists.  Since the Weinstein 
decision, the focus has been on the employment contract and 
intellectual property policy at the particular university.185  It 

 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 417. 
 184. See id. 
 185. For a particularly good discussion of this see James B. Wadley & 
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seems that only tradition and custom, remembered by the 
university, keeps the teacher exception in place. 
B. A RETURN TO OWNERSHIP OPTIONS 
In 1989, CCNV v. Reid further delineated the definition of 
“employee” in the case of work made for hire.186  Some people 
have interpreted Reid as stating that, in most cases, teacher’s 
creative works fall under scope of employment, and therefore 
many believe that the “teacher exception” no longer exists.187  
What is interesting is that there are some instances where 
professors’ and/or graduate students’ work would not fit into 
the scope of employment, and would, as in the Reid case, be the 
property of the professor/student creator.  Elements to consider 
in evaluating whether a person is an “employee” include 
benefits, the amount of control over the “manner and means of 
creation,” the skills required, the right to assign additional 
projects, and tax treatment of the individual.188  Many of the 
court’s reasons why the sculptor in Reid did not meet the work-
for-hire requirements would apply to non-tenured faculty, 
graduate students, and adjuncts as well: 
Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation.  Reid supplied his own tools.  
He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision 

JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, 
Work-For-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385 
(Spring, 1999). 
 186. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).  To determine whether someone is an employee 
for the purposes of determining ownership of the copyright, the Court 
developed a three-step test.  See Wadley & Brown, supra note 185, at 396.  
First, does an employment relationship exist, with the critical element, from 
cases following Reid, hinging on whether “the hiring party failed to extend 
benefits or pay social security taxes,” two of the factors on a non-exhaustive 
list developed by the Reid court.  Id.  These factors include skills required, 
source of the instrumentalities and tools, location of the work, duration of the 
relationship between the parties, whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party, extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work, method of payment, hired party’s 
role in hiring and paying assistants, whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party, whether the hiring party is in business, provision 
of employee benefits, and tax treatment of hired party.  Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-
52.  Then, one must determine whether the works were produced within the 
scope of the employee’s employment, and if not, whether the work could fall 
under and meet the requirements for the specially commissioned category of 
works for hire.  See Wadley & Brown, supra note 185, at 396-97. 
 187. See, e.g., Wadley & Brown, supra note 185. 
 188. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).  For more on 
the Aymes five factor test and its application in a university setting, see 
Laughlin, supra note 1. 
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of his activities from Washington practicably impossible.  Reid was 
retained for less than two months, a relatively short period of time.  
During and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional 
projects to Reid. . . . Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying 
assistants.  ‘Creating sculptures was hardly ‘regular business’ for 
CCNV.’  Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all.  Finally, CCNV did 
not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee 




In many ways, adjuncts and some graduate students would 
fall into this category as they are employed on short-term 
contracts, often without benefits, using their own computers 
and other “tools” (often not even being given an office).190  It 
may be that Reid has created a situation where full-time, 
tenure-track professors are treated as employees, but adjuncts 
and graduate students would be treated as independent 
contractors rather than as employees for purposes of 
determining ownership in copyrighted materials.  However, 
distinguishing between the status of employees does not seem 
to be how the university policies distinguish ownership.  
Instead, policies have tended to concentrate on a different set of 
elements—the kind of material created and/or the amount of 
resources contributed by the university.  Both of these elements 
are indicative of the potential commercial interests in 
copyrighted works that the university is pursuing, or would at 
least like the potential to pursue. 
At this point, even Nimmer on Copyright is unsure of the 
ownership of course materials produced by faculty under the 
work-for-hire doctrine.  The treatise states on one hand: “[I]f a 
professor elects to reduce his lectures to writing, the professor 
and not the institution employ ing [sic] him owns the copyright 
in such lectures.”191  In a footnote, however, after reviewing the 
Sherrill, Williams, and Hays cases (but not discussing the 
Weinstein case), and then turning to Reid, the treatise 
concludes: “Given that universities typically do not dictate the 
manner and means for a professor to reduce his lectures to 
writing, . . . perhaps such works still fall outside the work-for-
hire doctrine even under the 1976 Act.”192  It is under the work-
for-hire doctrine that many university policies (and the 

 189. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53. 
 190. See Garon, supra note 35, at 151 (“Adjunct faculty generally will not 
be employees under the Supreme Court’s test, because they are not regular 
salaried employees receiving benefits.”). 
 191. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][1][b][i]. 
 192. Id at n.94. 
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Weinstein case) rely, coupled with employment contracts.193 
A third kind of ownership is when an author is 
commissioned to create a particular work.194  To be considered a 
work-for-hire, the commissioned work must fall under one of 
nine enumerated categories, and both parties must put in 
writing that the copyright has been assigned from the author to 
the one that has commissioned the work.195  Teaching and 
scholarly work could fit under nearly every category, depending 
on the work: 1) a contribution to a collective work; 2) a part of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work; 3) a translation; 4) a 
supplementary work; 5) a compilation; 6) an instructional text; 
7) a test; 8) answer material for a test; and 9) an atlas.196 
A teacher/scholar can therefore assign copyright to the 
university/school.  Under Copyright law, both the scholar and 
the university must sign an agreement, “which includes the 
appropriate transfer language.”197  Some question exists 
whether this requirement is met in cases where work-for-hire 
does not apply and universities are relying on assignment 
because the teacher/scholar is generally the only party signing 
the employment contract with the assignment clause; the 
university generally does not sign the employment contract.198 
Jon Garon, Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law 
Center, suggests that ownership of adjunct works might 
require assignment because their work would probably not 
meet scope-of-employment requirements for work-for-hire 
ownership.199  Another area that would require assignment is 
distance learning because tasks might fall outside the 
traditional scope of employment. 
C. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE TEACHER EXCEPTION 
“. . . the notion that a common law tradition survives, 
despite the language of the [Copyright] statute, may be 
undermined when the academic tradition that gave rise 

 193. See infra Part III.C. 
 194. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][2]. 
 195. Id. 
 196. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). 
 197. See Garon, supra note 35, at 151. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  Garon suggests that adjuncts who teach at more than one 
institution license their work to the university, rather than give an all-out 
assignment of ownership.  Id.  Of course, adjuncts are the least powerful group 
of academics, and the likelihood of an adjunct having bargaining power to 
achieve these ends seems unlikely. 
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to that tradition is itself transforming through the 
growth of new teaching media.”200 
Jon Garon, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce 
Law Center 
It appears now that only custom holds the “teacher 
exception” in place, and even though only the 7th Circuit has 
gone this far, universities have taken advantage of this new 
space to obtain a firm hold on new commercial advantages.  
Weinstein clearly made the “teacher exception” in a “work-for-
hire” context dependent on university policy.201  Hays, in dicta, 
tried to make the “teacher exception” more stable, by claiming 
that the 1976 act had not abolished the “teacher exception.”  
Posner left the door open, however, as did Easterbrook in 
Weinstein, that a day might come when that will change.202 
A recent law review article by Georgia Holmes and Daniel 
A. Levin entitled “Who Owns Course Materials Prepared by a 
Teacher or Professor?  The Application of Copyright Law to 
Teaching Materials in the Internet Age,” concluded that the 
“teacher exception” continues to exist, “at least in the absence 
of an explicit agreement to the contrary between the institution 
and the faculty member.”203  But many of the reasons that 
Holmes and Levin offer are no longer valid in a more 
commercialized and digital environment, as this section will 
discuss.  Before leaving the “teacher exception” to look at how 
intellectual property policies have shifted the discourse to one 
of university ownership, consider the traditional reasons for the 
“teacher exception,” and whether the justification for faculty 
ownership can withstand the pressures of technological 
changes.  This section will use the conclusion of Holmes and 
Levin as a starting place, although their ideas and reasons are 
the traditional reasons for the “teacher exception,” found in 
many sources, including case law. 
Among the reasons Holmes and Levin believe the “teacher 
exception” will survive is that lecture notes and other materials 
have traditionally had no or limited commercial value, and 
therefore institutions “would typically have no reason to want 
copyright ownership of such lecture notes.”204  Commercial 

 200. Id. at 152 (italics added). 
 201. See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 202. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 203. See Holmes & Levin, supra note 1, at 186. 
 204. Id. 
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advantages of distance learning and other new knowledge-
based products are quickly altering that dynamic, and colleges 
and universities are already adopting special distance learning 
policies for ownership of lectures and other course materials.205 
Holmes and Levin give a second reason for the “teacher 
exception.”  As professors move from college to college, they 
need to be able to transport their knowledge.206  However, as 
the university becomes more commercialized, knowledge is 
commodified rather than individualized.  The basis for the 
argument that institutions did not need ownership was that 
they had no reason to want the materials to be presented in a 
particular expression.  However, with the advent of digital 
technologies and the sales of knowledge and expression, this 
may no longer be the case.  This is already occurring, as in the 
case of the Harvard professor who decided to teach an online 
course for another university, and Harvard sued to prevent 
dilution of cultural capital (the idea of a Harvard professor).207  
While not using copyright infringement as a justification, the 
example nevertheless points to the changing relationship of the 
professor to the more commercialized world in which 
universities find themselves. 
Holmes and Levin’s third reason for the survival of the 
“teacher exception,” again a traditional reason given in case 
law, is that the institutions would have to know the content of 
the professor’s lectures in order to qualify under the Reid 
test.208  However, this is also antiquated.  With fully wired 
classrooms all over the country, it would not be difficult for 
those lectures to be videotaped or digitally recorded, creating a 
fixed form of copyrightable expression, as well as serving as a 
monitoring device to satisfy university ownership. 
The fourth reason Holmes and Levin give is that a 
professor’s lectures should be treated differently as “a unique 
kind of intellectual product.”209  As to the fifth reason, Holmes 
and Levin cite the Posner idea that applying “work-for-hire” to 
the scholar would “wreak havoc” on the system.210  The system 
is already in great flux, and more havoc is expected.  The 

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commercialization of the university is already underway, and 
with it, the change of standards, practices, and influences.  
Capitalism creates its own traditions. 
Holmes and Levin’s sixth reason, that “there is a lack of fit 
between the policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the 
conditions of academic production,” may also have problems.211  
Technology transfer offices, for instance, believe that profit for 
the individual professor and for his/her department is a great 
incentive for academic production.  The sciences have been 
operating from this approach for many years; universities 
initially own patents professors acquire. 
What is missing from their list is an important concept 
raised by Jon Garon, whose thoughts began this section.  He 
writes, “[t]he reasons for providing a teacher’s exception to the 
work-for-hire doctrine flow primarily from the desire to provide 
faculty sufficient autonomy from their employers.”212  That 
aspect has completely disappeared, as university policies now 
dictate the ownership relationship between faculty and the 
university.  If the university has a stake at potential profit and 
ownership, the university is more likely to take an interest in 
content and subject matter of projects.  The scenario most 
feared by faculty is that eventually the university might begin 
dictating or censoring work, all for the sake of profit from 
ownership. 
IV.NAVIGATING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY POLICIES 
This article has chronicled the commercial development in 
the university setting, particularly in the areas of patent and 
copyright.  Then the article explained what items in the 
university are copyrightable, and the potential options of 
ownership under the 1976 Copyright Act.  Next the article 
argued that the “teacher exception,” which previously gave 
ownership to teachers as an exception to the work-for-hire 
doctrine, is now at the university’s discretion, despite the fact 
that it had not been debated as part the copyright law 
revisions.  The reason for the lack of debate is that the “teacher 
exception” was not at issue.  As the Williams case in the midst 
of the revisions indicated, and Judge Posner reaffirmed in 
1987, the “teacher exception” was widely accepted, despite the 

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paucity of cases.  The next section looks at how universities 
have implemented their power to determine ownership, looking 
specifically at a number of recent intellectual property policies. 
This section looks at the current state of intellectual 
property from a number of vantage points.  First, the work 
examines an innovative policy by the Consortium for 
Educational Technology for University Systems that seeks to 
unbundle copyright rights, claiming that ownership 
determination is not necessary.  Then, the section turns to two 
more traditional policies, found at the University of Arizona 
and University of Iowa, based on the work-for-hire provision.  
Finally, it looks to Stanford University’s policy whose language 
claims absolute ownership of faculty works.  After viewing 
these three policies, the work then looks to two groups 
concerned with copyright policy in the university.  One group 
outside the university, the American Association of University 
Professors; and the other, inside the university, the University 
of California Copyright Taskforce.  The section then turns to 
two final university efforts to clarify copyright, one at Columbia 
University, and the other at the University of Texas, Austin, 
both of which show thoughtful consideration of the complex 
issues and conflicting interests. 
A. THE CONSORTIUM - UNBUNDLING RIGHTS - A NEW APPROACH 
The Consortium for Educational Technology for University 
Systems (CETUS) is one example of ways in which universities 
are trying to work out intellectual property policies that 
contend with new technology, the impact of commercialization 
in the university, and the place of the 
teacher/scholar/professor.213  Comprised of three of the largest 
public institutions in the country, California State University 
System, State University System of New York, and City 
University of New York, CETUS put together a 
pamphlet/discussion series, Ownership of New Works at the 
University: Unbundling of Rights and the Pursuit of Higher 
Education.214  CETUS was formed in July 1995 to pool 

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resources and ideas in order to determine various intellectual 
property and other current technology-associated problems 
confronting universities and colleges today. 
The Consortium wants to create a circular, rather than 
linear copyright relationship between the university and the 
author/faculty, creating interdependence and “ongoing mutual 
reinforcement of shared interests.”215  The cycle has six steps: 
1. the creative environment fosters work protected by copyright 
2. the works are protected by copyright ownership 
3. the benefits of authorship accrue to the creator/author 
4. appropriate benefits of ownership also accrue to the 
institution 
5. the institution fosters a creative/scholarly environment 
6. the creative cycle can begin again
216
 
CETUS does not explicitly name the “teacher exception” to 
the work-for-hire doctrine, but CETUS does discuss the 
instability of the law.  The pamphlet says: 
Although the work-for-hire doctrine may be widely applied in the 
commercial environment, statutes and court rulings do not make 
clear whether creative or scholarly work by faculty members should 
be treated as work-for-hire.  The law also does not make clear 




The pamphlet suggests that a contract can clarify the 
uncertainty of law “or if the law produces an undesirable 
result.”218 
CETUS looks at three factors to determine not only 
copyright ownership, but also the allocation of rights: “1) the 
creative initiate for the new work; 2) the control of its contents; 
and 3) any extraordinary compensation or support provided by 
the university.”219  The first factor, creative initiative, is to be 
presumed in favor of the author/faculty, with the burden placed 
on the university to “state the rights it wishes to exercise in the 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (OCT. 1999), at *21, available at 
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language of prior agreements, if any, to be proposed before the 
creative effort begins.”220  This is interesting.  The traditional 
“teacher exception” applies, unless the university creates an 
agreement that changes the relationship from the start.  
Regarding the third factor, extraordinary compensation or 
support, the pamphlet admits that funding alone will not 
satisfy the work-for-hire doctrine and bring the employee’s 
work within the scope of employment or an independent 
contract.  “Consequently, an ‘independent contractor’ may be 
paid for work, but that person is not an employee and will 
therefore probably be the copyright owner under the law.”221  
This is an important statement that admits that the 
substantial or extraordinary use of materials may not 
necessarily bring the copyrighted work under the work-for-hire 
doctrine.  Many policies today distinguish substantial use or 
extraordinary use of materials as a reason for claiming 
ownership. 
CETUS also advocates unbundling traditional copyright.  
Through standard licensing agreements, CETUS seeks to 
identify the competing rights and interests of the professors 
and the university to the copyrighted creative work and give 
both sides assurances.  For instance, the faculty/author would 
be able to, without obtaining permission from the university-
owner: reproduce the work in teaching and scholarship, use 
portions of the work in compilations, make derivative works, 
update the work, and use the work with a new employer.  The 
standard licensing language was written in 1995.  If the text 
were written today, it may not be so generous in its philosophy.  
When the work is owned by the creator, the university might 
want non-exclusive licenses to use the work within the 
university system, and the right to control whether the 
university’s name is placed on the work.  What is strange is the 
recognition that under the law, the owner controls all of these 
determinations, and that without clear-cut ownership, none of 
these allocations seem possible, even by contract.  The other 
question is why one side would want the other to have rights to 
something they do not own.  In the case of the university-
owner, it appears that this is a way to keep the teacher-
exception in place (and not stir up too much animosity), while 
actually owning and controlling the work. 
These rules go toward the traditional arenas of faculty 

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ownership; the pamphlet specifically makes clear that 
administrative work by faculty are the property of the 
institution, regardless of the factors test. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of ‘unbundling’ of rights we espouse here, 
the university may own the copyright, but the professor(s) who 
created it should have rights to use the content in other contexts, 
particularly future projects of a similar nature, or to incorporate the 
content into scholarly studies or instruction.
222
 
Through license agreements, reproduction, use, and control, the 
copyrighted work is maximized for “the mutual benefit of 
the . . . other members of the university community.”223  This 
seems strikingly similar to the view of a technology transfer 
office, which handles the licensing of patents.  In this scheme, 
copyrights would be handled in a similar matter, with the 
university helping to license copyrighted works.  CETUS gives 
the example of licensing particular rights to a publisher rather 
than assigning all rights, as is traditionally done, thereby 
allowing the retention of the rights to “reproduce and distribute 
the work for educational and research purposes throughout at 
least the home campus,” as well as the professor’s right to 
develop derivative works.224 
As an example, CETUS acknowledges that while 
departments may be asking faculty to create web sites, the 
actual content is left up to the individual instructor: “The 
extent to which an individual faculty member contributes to 
the course materials will weigh in favor of the faculty member’s 
ownership of copyright.”225  CETUS also acknowledges that 
while course syllabi are developed to be consistent with course 
catalogue descriptions, the actual scope and content of a 
particular course is usually left up to the faculty member.226  
Generally, if the materials are circulated only to the students 
or university officials, the faculty member has retained 
“complete control over creation, modification, and even access 
to the materials.  This level of control helps strengthen the 
professor’s rights.”227  However, if a professor distributes the 
materials at a conference or puts the work on the Internet, then 
the professor has far less control over the materials, because he 
has “increased the opportunities for others to build upon those 

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creative works.”228  The control factor under this plan seems to 
miss the point: publishing the materials on the Internet should 
not change the outcome of the control factor test.  If the 
professor owns the copyright on her syllabus when she passes it 
out to the class on the first day, she owns all of the bundle of 
rights associated with copyright, including the right to 
distribute, perform publicly, reproduce, and make derivative 
works.  Placing the work in a particular medium should not 
alter or lessen a copyright owner’s rights; in fact, the objective 
of copyright is to give incentive for “authors” to create and 
distribute works for the public’s benefit and education, as 
stated in the copyright clause in the U.S. Constitution.229  But 
like the University of Arizona policy that distinguishes works 
by the form they take, the CETUS policy distinguishes works 
based on what right from the copyright has been used – namely 
distribution – to change the nature of the ownership in the 
work itself. 
Finally, with regard to traditional areas of scholarly 
work—in this case journal articles—CETUS suggests that the 
university does have “a strong interest in how the faculty 
member chooses to manage the ownership of that copyright.”230  
There is an almost paternalistic tone, where CETUS explains 
that professors assign copyright to publishers “leaving that 
professor unable even to use his own work in future research 
and teaching without permission from the publisher.”231  To 
combat that, the university “may assert a ‘shop right’ that 
would require the professor to retain rights to use the article 
for teaching and research by that professor and by all 
colleagues at that university.”232 
CETUS is only one example of the innovations in 
intellectual property (IP) policies that are being thought of 
around the country, as universities, now in the driver’s seat, 
navigate traditional notions of faculty ownership of their 
works, which are increasingly collaborative works in digital 
and electronic spaces, and the economic incentives that might 
be derived from the creativity at the university. 

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The National Education Association (NEA), for example, 
seems to support dolling out rights to both universities and 
faculty, particularly in relation to distance learning.  Faculty 
own their originally produced materials and are able to take all 
materials they create with them, should they move to another 
college, even if the materials are used in a courseware 
product.233  The college owns the courseware product itself, and 
is free to use the materials.  The faculty member has right of 
first refusal to teach the course, and faculty share in the 
revenue.  The NEA sees this resolution as an example of 
successful collective bargaining. 
B. THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 
University of Arizona exemplifies a trend toward 
universities encroaching on ownership rights in the electronic 
arena, but so far maintaining a teacher exception on traditional 
works in non-electronic form.  The IP policy produced at the 
Regents level provides a good example of a number of policies 
across the country.  Like many universities around the country, 
University of Arizona, Arizona State University, and Northern 
Arizona University are governed by one state Board of 
Regents.234  In 1999, the Arizona Board of Regents adopted a 
new Intellectual Property Policy that blends traditional 
“teacher exception” values with the Weinstein ideas that 
collaboration falls under the ownership of the university.  In 
the new policy, an uncertain space of copyright ownership is 
saved for new technology and economic gains of works created 
in electronic spheres. 
The new policy has been embroiled in controversy, in part 
because of how the new policy was created.  According to 
Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Faculty Jerold E. 
Hogle, the new policy was created without input from the 
Faculty Senate or any other faculty-centered group.235  Instead, 
business and university attorneys created a policy that was 

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adopted by the Board of Regents.  The rationale Professor 
Hogle gave for this was that going through the regular 
channels of faculty committees would have taken too long, and 
might have jeopardized business relations with the 
university.236  Professor Hogle commented that the Faculty 
Senate should have been able to review the policy and make 
recommendations, even if those recommendations were 
ignored, as that is part of the Faculty Senate’s duties and 
responsibilities.237  The policy itself does not appear radical.  If 
anything, the policy remains vague regarding technology-based 
faculty creations. 
The policy boldly declares: “Federal and state law provide 
for Board ownership of intellectual property created by 
university employees . . . [t]his policy covers all forms of legally 
recognized ‘Intellectual Property’. . . .”238  The Board, overseeing 
the university, owns all university employee-created 
intellectual property.239  In the case of copyright, the policy 
defines the scope of university ownership to include, but not be 
limited to: 
a) scholarly works (e.g. textbooks, class notes, research monographs 
and articles, publications, instructional materials, and research 
materials); 
b) creative/artistic works (e.g. music, art, dance, architecture, 
sculpture, poetry, fiction, and film); 
c) copyrightable software (commercial as well as academic or 
research); 
d) other developing areas, including but not limited to multimedia 
works, and various other forms of electronic communications, 




Also included as part of the Board’s domain of intellectual 
property are various forms of data: “All data are considered to 

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be subject to this policy, as intellectual property is often 
present in data that are generated during research at the 
university.  Data shall include but not be limited to: a) lab 
notes, results of analyses, etc.; b) research notes, research data 
reports and research notebooks, etc.”241  At first, this looks as if 
the Regents have claimed ownership over all intellectual 
property, including spaces traditionally occupied by the 
“teacher exception,” including textbook, research notes, and 
creative/artistic works.  However, the policy exempts university 
ownership of these works. 
What the Regents do claim ownership to are sponsor-
supported projects, university-assigned projects, and 
university-assisted projects.242  Sponsor-supported include 
funds from non-university entities, generally for the science 
side of the campus.243  University-assigned projects are defined 
as intellectual property “developed as a result of employee work 
performed in the course and scope of employment,” which the 
Board owns.244  The policy defines “course and scope of 
employment” to include “any activity that is listed or described 
in the employee’s job description or is within the employee’s 
field of employment, including research, instruction, or other 
activities assigned to the employee that involve the creation of 
Intellectual Property.”245  The policy explicitly states that 
“[c]opyrightable works . . . are considered to be works made for 
hire under U.S. Copyright Law, with ownership vested in the 
Board.”246  This seems to indicate the “teacher exception” has 
disappeared, since it explicitly names research and teaching 
activities. 
The third category is university-assisted projects.247  These 
projects are developed by university employees and “make 
significant use of university resources.”248  The policy notes that 
“the Board does not construe the use of office space, library 
resources, personal workstations, or personal computers as 
constituting significant use of university resources.”249  In this 
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way, the policy is following the traditional distinctions set out 
in case law, and in particular, in the Seventh Circuit cases.  
The policy goes on to describe more fully “significant use” as: 
use of research funding, use of funding allocated by asynchronous or 
distance learning programs, use of university-paid time within 
employment period; assistance of support staff; use of 
telecommunication services; use of university central computing 
resources; use of instructional design or media production services; 




In this way, the policy resembles the Consortium’s policy, 
in that using additional resources or creating a collaborated 
work awards ownership of the work to the university.  The 
difference is that the university claims ownership from the 
outset, and now groups ownership into categories. 
The fourth category is employee-excluded works. 
[T]he Board releases to the creator all ownership of Intellectual 
Property in the following categories of work, subject to contractual 
rights of Sponsors: 
a) traditional publications in academia, including scholarly 
works, textbooks, and course notes 
b) artistic works (music, dance, film, etc.) 
c) academic software (not for commercial application) 
d) student works (the student owns his/her works, unless the 
student is a university employee and the work is part of 
his/her employment, or the student makes significant use of 
university resources, or the student’s work is part of a 
Sponsor-supported project.  Student works are not subject to 
revenue sharing described above.) 
e) electronic publications, including on-line courses will be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.251 
A number of things are interesting about this policy.  First, 
the Board has gone out of its way to assert its legal right to 
ownership of all intellectual property.  Second, the Board has 
not used the “individual” versus “collaborative” distinction for 
its policy.  Instead, the Board asserts its rights on everything, 
in all categories, and then provides exceptions. 
As to the exceptions themselves, the wording in the first 
exception is interesting: “traditional publications in academia.”  
Does this mean it excludes non-traditional publication arenas, 
such as internet or other new forms of publication?  What they 

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are releasing are traditional categories where the courts have 
found professors to hold the copyright, that is, lecture notes, 
(Williams, Abernethy, Caird) articles (Weinstein) and scholarly 
works and textbooks (Sherril, Hayes).  The second exception of 
artistic works recalls the Weinstein opinion, in which Judge 
Easterbrook wrote, “[w]hen Saul Bellows, a professor at 
University of Chicago, writes a novel, he may keep the 
royalties.”252 
The fifth exception, regarding electronic publications, is not 
an exception, but a wait-and-see space.  Unlike the Consortium 
that gave ownership of web sites created on faculty’s own 
initiative without additional compensation to faculty, the 
Arizona Board of Regents policy leaves the ownership question 
unanswered.  While projects using university office equipment 
and the library are not to be construed as university-assisted, 
the universities have also claimed ownership to all intellectual 
property.  This implies that until a decision is made in favor of 
the faculty, the university owns electronic publications, merely 
because it is not within the traditional forms of academic 
communication.  The Board is maneuvering for the future, 
waiting to see what happens, unwilling to give up ownership on 
potentially lucrative electronic publications.  Recall that the 
policy reserves the rights of “on-line courses” for case-by-case 
determination.253 
Nick Goodman of the University of Arizona Attorney’s 
Office, said the University has been working on a policy that 
would set clear standards.254  In general, he said the policy 
would address electronic publications, software, and other 
digital creations (including websites).  Currently, the line 
between faculty and university ownership depends on the 
resources used, consistent with the current ABOR IP policy.  
He asserted that if there is any significant use of resources (the 
multimedia lab, for instance) for the creation of work beyond 
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the desktop computer and standard office staff, the university 
will take an interest and claim ownership.  However, as the 
current Arizona Board of Regents IP policy indicates, even then 
the claim of ownership has exceptions, including academic 
software.  Goodman explained that categories like these give 
the university and faculty room to define software as academic 
(therefore the university does not have an interest in it), and is 
particularly useful when there is no commercial or economic 
advantage to university ownership. 
Another interesting aspect of the policy is that creators 
“must disclose any intellectual property . . . in which the Board 
or Sponsor may have an interest.”255  An attorney in the 
Technology Transfer Office said his office follows a “don’t ask, 
don’t tell policy.”  The university does not have the staff to 
police copyright ownership at the university.  Moreover, there 
is still little economic incentive for such policing.  At the 
University of Arizona, however, a number of committees are 
exploring distance learning and online class policies.256  
Universities have traditionally claimed ownership in materials, 
but have not enforced their ownership rights.257 
C. THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA 
The University of Iowa summarizes the two approaches 
presented above, recognizing these as the two major strands of 
ownership theory.258  The policy begins by quoting the 
University of Iowa Operations Manual section laying out the 
ownership parameters: 
[e]xcept as provided in V-31-3, textbooks and other products of 
teaching, research, scholarship, and artistic endeavors belong to the 
faculty or staff member when the product is not the result of a specific 
assignment or commission and where there is no substantial 
University contribution or support beyond the salary, developmental 
assignment, services, and facilities (including libraries and 
laboratories) customarily provided to faculty in the respective 
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If this statement does not make it clear that the University 
of Iowa is not claiming ownership in course materials, the next 
sentence makes it explicit: “[h]owever, other universities have 
made claims of ownership of course-related materials developed 
by faculty.”260  The University of Iowa also notes that CETUS 
“suggests that university ownership of intellectual property 
does not have to be an ‘all-or-nothing proposition’ and that the 
‘unbundling’ of intellectual property rights may best serve the 
university community.”261  University of Iowa, therefore, is 
currently giving ownership to faculty in traditional materials 
and in their course materials, but recognizing the possibilities 
of what others are doing. 
D. STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
Stanford’s policy contains problems similar to those in 
policies like the Arizona Regent’s policy.  Their policy states: 
“[i]n accord with academic tradition, except to the extent set 
forth in this policy, Stanford does not claim ownership to 
pedagogical, scholarly, or artistic works, regardless of their 
form of expression.”262  Ownership of lecture and other teaching 
materials is not addressed.  “The University claims no 
ownership of popular nonfiction, novels, textbooks, poems, 
musical compositions, unpatentable software, or other works of 
artistic imagination which are not institutional works and did 
not make significant use of University resources or the services 
of University non-faculty employees working within the scope 
of their employment.”263  Nor do lecture and course materials 
appear under the category of institutional works.  The only 
possible mention could be under the category of “Videotaping 
and Related Classroom Technology,” the first line of which 
reads: “[c]ourses taught and courseware developed for teaching 
at Stanford belong to Stanford.”264  Scholars are also required to 
sign a “Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford 
Personnel,” which reads in part: 
Stanford policy states that all rights in copyright shall remain with 
the creator unless the work: (a) is a work-for-hire (and copyright 
therefore vests in the University under copyright law), (b) is 

 260. Id. 
 261. Id. (quotes in original). 
 262. Stanford University, Copyright Policy (RPH 5.2), at 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/5-2.html. (last visited Jan. 16, 2003). 
 263. Id.  Why the adjective “popular” is added to nonfiction is unclear, 
especially since most scholarship does not become “popular.” 
 264. Id. 
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supported by a direct allocation of funds through the University for 
the pursuit of a specific project, (c) is commissioned by the University, 
or (d) is otherwise subject to contractual obligations. 
265
 
Why lecture materials, but not works of scholarship or 
other nonfiction works would fall under the work-for-hire 
exemption, is unclear. 
E. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
The American Association of University Professors’ 
(AAUP) position on copyright came out of a Special Committee 
on Distance Education established in June 1998.266  A year 
later, they released statements on distance learning and 
copyright protection.267  This was the first intellectual property 
policy the AAUP produced since their 1915 foundation.268  The 
AAUP policy reflects the current debate and includes views of 
different constituencies within the AAUP.269 
The AAUP began their Statement on Copyright with the 
United States Constitution copyright clause’s objective “to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts.”270  Institutions 
of higher learning should interpret the clause and subsequent 
copyright laws to “encourage the discovery of new knowledge 
and its dissemination to students, to the profession and to the 
public.”271  While not naming the “teacher exception” as such, 
the Copyright Statement explains that “it has been the 
prevailing academic practice to treat faculty members as the 
copyright owner [sic] of works that are created independently 

 265. Stanford University, Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford 
Personnel, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/su18.html (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2003). 
 266. AAUP, Committee R on Government Relationship; Report on Distance 
Learning, at http://www.aaup.org/Issues/DistanceEd/Archives/dlreport.htm. 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2002).  See also, AAUP, Statement on Distance Education, 
at http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/StDistEd.HTM (last visited Jan. 
16, 2003); AAUP, Statement on Copyright, at 
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Spccopyr.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 
2003). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Mark F. Smith, Intellectual Property and the AAUP, 88 ACADEME, 
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 39. 
 269. Id. at 41.  Included are the views of the “standing committees on 
accreditation, government relations, and academic freedom, and the teaching 
committee’s subcommittee on the use of technology in college and university 
instruction . . . [and] the staff director of a collective bargaining chapter.”  Id. 
 270. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 271. Id.  The Statement on Copyright cites the AAUP’s 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure as reflecting this mission. 
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and at the faculty member’s own initiative for traditional 
academic purposes.”272  This includes “class notes and syllabi, 
books and articles, works of fiction and nonfiction, poems and 
dramatic works, musical and choreographic works, pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works, and educational software, 
commonly known as ‘courseware.’”273  This statement merged 
the property discussed in cases (class notes, articles, and 
fiction) with the non-exclusive list of materials found in the 
Copyright Act itself.274  The Copyright Statement notes that 
faculty ownership has traditionally disregarded the form of the 
work; that is, whether the form is traditional, audiovisual, or 
electronic, faculty members have historically been treated as 
the owners of those copyrights.275 
The Copyright Statement explores three scenarios of 
ownership in the university context.  Some institutions have 
handbooks that assign copyright from the faculty to the 
university.  This is distinct from policies in which the 
university initially owns the copyright.  The AAUP statement 
notes the initial faculty owner must assign over her rights in 
writing to the university for the assignment to be legal.276  The 
writing requirement of a valid transfer is satisfied by a faculty 
“condition of employment, [to] sign a faculty handbook which 
purports to vest in the institution the ownership of all works 
created by the faculty member for an indefinite future.”277  The 
assignment scenario could be initiated either because the 
university fears the teacher is the original owner, or believes 
the work may fall under the independent contractor’s 
commissioned works categories of the Copyright Act. 
One lawyer advocating the assignment approach (described 
above in the AAUP’s Statement of Copyright) is Clark Shore, 
Assistant General Attorney for the State of Washington, who 
made a presentation at the Association of Research Library’s 
Copyright and Leadership Workshop in the mid-1990s.278  Clark 

 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) protects “(1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” 
 275. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 276. Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000). 
 277. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 278. Clark Shore, “Ownership of Faculty Works and University Copyright 
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Shore’s article, “Ownership of Faculty Works and University 
Copyright Policies,” published in ALR, reflects the power 
universities have through their policies to determine 
ownership.279  According to Shore, the work-for-hire doctrine 
would not be well-received by faculty if the university suddenly 
claimed ownership to all traditional and non-traditional forms 
of writings.  Instead, Shore advocated an employment contract 
requiring assignment of copyright to the university “when the 
determination has been made that the university has an 
interest in the work.”280  The determination would be made and 
policies implemented by a new administrative office: the 
University Copyright Office.  A threshold would be established 
beyond which faculty would be required to report “any 
copyrightable work of potential commercial value.”281  If the 
university became interested, the faculty and university would 
enter into an agreement (if written assignment of copyright 
was necessary), or the university would claim its rights under 
the work-for-hire doctrine (if the work fell within that 
framework).  “In cases where the parties agree the work is not 
a work for hire, a simple assignment of copyright interests will 

Policy,” 189 ALR: A BIMONTHLY NEWSLETTER OF RESEARCH LIBRARY ISSUES 
AND ACTIONS 2 (Dec. 1996) available at 
http://www.alr.org/newsltr/189/owner.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003.  Shore 
presented a more extended version of this paper at the ALR Copyright and 
Leadership Workshop in Seattle, Washington.  He argued that: 
[a] university policy concerning copyright interests in faculty works 
should address at least the following issues: (1) whether the 
university will assert an ownership interest in some faculty works, 
and, if so, which ones; (2) the means by which the university will 
obtain an ownership interest in those faculty works not considered 
works for hire; and (3) the process by which determinations of 
institutional interest will be made. 
Id.  Shore noted that the class approach reduces the burden on the 
administration making individual determinations. See id.  Shore explained 
that the general factors approach, used at many universities, involves five 
factors: 
(1) the extent to which institutional resources were used in preparing 
the work; (2) the commercial character of the work; (3) the utilitarian 
(as opposed to purely scholarly or aesthetic) character of the work; (4) 
the connection between the work and the faculty member’s job 
responsibilities; (5) the concern to avoid disputes within the 
university community. 
Id.  Shore noted that these considerations parallel the statutory balancing test 
of the fair use doctrine.  See id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 281. Id. 
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suffice.”282  Three things come to mind.  First, there is no 
indication that the university is doing anything to receive this 
assignment, even registering the copyright.  Second, this policy 
would encourage faculty not to pursue commercial projects so 
as to have no interference from the university.  Third, by 
assigning rights to the university, the faculty member no 
longer controls the elements of copyright she might deem 
important: making derivative works, controlling publication, 
etc.—all of the rights connected to a copyrighted work that the 
AAUP are concerned in protecting. 
Returning to the AAUP’s ownership categories, the “work-
for-hire” scenario makes the institution the initial owner.  The 
Copyright Statement focuses on defining the concept of “scope 
of employment”—a key component in determining whether the 
work is the legal property of the employer.283  The Copyright 
Statement first reiterates the traditional elements of the scope 
of employment, as described in Reid,284 including the content of 
the work being under the direction, control, design and 
supervision of the employer.285  The committee contrasted this 
with academic work explaining, “[i]n the case of traditional 
academic works, however, the faculty member, rather than the 
institution determines the subject matter, the intellectual 
approach and the direction, and the conclusions, . . . the very 
essence of academic freedom.”286  The committee also explained 
the danger in an institution owning the materials because: 
[The institution] would have the powers, for example, to decide where 
the work is to be published, to edit and otherwise revise it, to prepare 
derivative works based thereon (such as translations, abridgements, 
and literary, musical, or artistic variations), and indeed to censor and 
forbid dissemination of the work altogether.  Such powers, so deeply 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of academic freedom, cannot 
rest with the institution.
287
 
These are now familiar arguments.  Corynne McSherry, in 
her recently published work, Who Owns Academic Work, 288 
seems to have missed this point entirely, though she quotes the 
same material.  McSherry appears to not understand why a 
policy that determined electronic ownership on a case-by-case 

 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 285. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. McSherry, supra note 1, at 102. 
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basis would be objectionable to faculty.  McSherry begins by 
relating the experience of a draft report on copyright prepared 
by the “University of the West”289 being circulated in September 
1998—only four months after the AAUP’s statement.  
McSherry writes that the report contained “a set of fairly 
noncontroversial recommendations,” which were objectionable 
“from faculty associations, technology transfer managers, and 
research administrators,” with the criticism “going so far as to 
suggest that the committee was too responsive to the 
administration and insufficiently committed to scholarship, 
creativity, and academic freedom.”290  According to McSherry, 
the committee failed to define ownership of copyright materials 
as a stable category a failure also present in the Regents of 
Arizona policy.  Under the Regents of Arizona’s policy, 
ownership (on a work-for-hire basis) on electronic forms of 
academic work would be decided on a case-by-case basis.  At 
the University of the West, according to McSherry, “class 
materials and lectures might not always fall into the category 
of ‘works of scholarship,’”—the category of faculty-owned 
material.291 
While McSherry admits that these sites of conflict are 
increasing, with “faculty copyrights . . . being construed as 
badges of autonomy, independence, and control,” she quickly 
explains that “University administrators across the country . . . 
are observing the institutional investment and profit potential 
in Internet-based education tools and software developed by 
faculty and students under university auspices, and are 
themselves moving to assert copyright ownership of some 
teaching materials.”292  Profit drives the policy, riding the 
argument that libraries need money for increased journal 
prices.  McSherry admits that faculty are suspicious of the new 
relationships between universities and for-profit “learning 
corporations,”293 and takes the argument to the realm of 
commodification: “activists warn faculty that they must 
carefully guard their copyrights if they wish to stave off 
commodification of education and the proletarianization of the 

 289. Id. (giving no citation to the draft and disguises the University of 
California with a fictional name, University of the West). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 103. 
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professoriate.”294  Still no mention for the concerns the AAUP 
noted – that by placing ownership in the hands of the 
university, academic freedom and the nature of the profession 
is at risk.  Instead, McSherry believes that faculty want to be 
seen as “arbiters of true and valuable knowledge . . . [a position 
that] depends on the location of academia outside the realm of 
commodity production and circulation,” and she sees a conflict 
in faculty owning their own works, because they are part of the 
commodified system.  She does not acknowledge that someone 
owns the material, and with ownership comes control to create 
and disseminate ideas. 
McSherry does not explain why faculty should be treated 
as knowledge owners rather than as knowledge workers, 
believing that faculty are only interested in ownership to keep 
their “monopoly of competence” in “cognitive property” in order 
to “control a market for their expertise,” and fear that their 
positions would be “downgrade[d] to that of an ordinary staff 
member.”295  Finally, in response to the AAUP’s concerns over a 
“work-for-hire” doctrine being applied to faculty work, and their 
fear that “such powers [are] deeply inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of academic freedom . . . .”296  McSherry 
responds: “[b]ut if there is something offensive about an 
institution controlling the dissemination of a work (including, 
by implication, its commercialization), it is not clear that there 
is anything inherently less offensive about an individual 
professor being able to do so.”297  She bases this opinion on her 
belief that “professors are supposed to be producing gifts, not 
commodities, and scholarship is supposed to be 
‘disinterested.’”298  However, professors live in a market 
economy, where their works are commodities, and as the last 
thirty years of cultural and literary theory have shown, 
scholarship can never come from a disinterested space. 
The AAUP’s Statement on Copyright continues, explaining 
there are some instances, as in the Arizona Regents policy, 
where the university does have a legitimate claim in 
ownership.  These are works where the university “provides the 
specific authorization or supervision of the preparation of the 
work,” with examples like “reports prepared by a dean or by the 

 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 108-9. 
 296. Id. at 110 (quoting AAUP, Statement on Copyright). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
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chair or members of a faculty committee, or college promotional 
brochures prepared by a director of admissions.”299 
The AAUP also sees a fourth type of ownership, situations 
where joint authorship between the university and the faculty 
member may be appropriate, where both share the copyright.  
“New instructional technologies” is a particular place this 
might apply, with content from faculty and technology from the 
university.300  The question of joint authorship qualifications 
under the copyright law, however, requires that each author 
contribute creatively.301  In some scenarios the university’s 
involvement will not rise to “authorship.”302  The statement 
explains: 
On the one hand, the institution may simply supply “delivery 
mechanisms,” such as videotaping, editing, and marketing services; in 
such a situation, it is very unlikely that the institution will be 
regarded as having contributed the kind of “authorship” that is 
necessary for a “joint work” that automatically entitles it to a share in 
the copyright ownership.  On the other hand, the institution may, 
through its administrators and staff, effectively determine or 
contribute to such detailed matters as substantive coverage, creative 
graphic elements, and the like; in such a situation, the institution has 
a stronger claim to co-ownership rights. 
303
 
This is a very different approach.  At some universities, the 
dividing point is the amount of additional resources the faculty 
member uses for the project.  The faculty member loses his 
ownership rights because he has used additional university 
resources; thereby, under a work-for-hire scenario, the 
university reclaims ownership.  This is problematic as the 
university, in disclaiming ownership, must make that 
assignment in writing.  Instead, the AAUP turns the burden 
back to the university, to show that the university has 

 299. Id.  Another situation is a work specifically commissioned in writing 
and falling outside “the normal scope of [a] person’s employment duties.”  Id.  
Thus the nine enumerated categories of commissioned works, an area often 
overlooked in the discussion of faculty/university ownership.  See id.  The third 
situation is described as contractual transfers, where, like in the Arizona 
Regent’s IP policy, the work is connected to an outside sponsor and licensing 
arrangements have been made.  See id.  The statement adds, “Similarly, the 
college or university may reasonably request that the faculty member—when 
entering into an agreement granting the copyright or publishing rights to a 
third party—make efforts to reserve to the institution the right to use the 
work in its internally administered programs of teaching, research, and public 
service on a perpetual, royalty-free, nonexclusive basis.”  Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 302. AAUP, Statement on Copyright, supra note 266. 
 303. Id. 
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contributed enough authorship to be included as a joint author.  
At no time does the faculty member lose the ownership of his 
syllabi, lecture notes, or other materials because they have 
been put into a new form requiring additional resources from 
the university.  Alternatively, a university might be 
“compensated with royalties commensurate with its 
investment” or be given “some sort of implied royalty-free 
‘license to use’ the copyrighted work.”304 
The statement ends with a list of items a faculty member 
may do, in the event that the university does claim ownership, 
either in a traditional or more technological setting: 
Conversely, where the institution holds all or part of the copyright, 
the faculty member should, at a minimum, retain the right to take 
credit for creative contributions, to reproduce the work for his or her 
instructional purposes, and to incorporate the work in future 
scholarly works authored by that faculty member.  In the context of 
distance-education courseware, the faculty member should also be 
given rights in connection with its future uses, not only through 
compensation but also through the right of “first refusal” in making 




F. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COPYRIGHT TASKFORCE 
In the last several decades, universities have become 
increasingly linked to commercial, governmental, and 
civil organizations and authorities.  As a result, 
universities are directly affected by the growing 
commercialization of copyrighted and copyrightable 
works.  At the same time digital technologies are making 
possible the creation of new genres of works never before 
imagined. . . 
Introduction, in UC, Universitywide Taskforce on 
Copyright306 
While the UC copyright policy has not changed since 1992, 
a Copyright Task Force was developed for the UC system, with 
the committee meeting from November 1997 to April 1998, 
“working in parallel with the Library Planning and Action 
Initiative Task Force.”307  In the introduction to Universitywide 

 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29. 
 307. Id at “Copyright Task Force.”  The copyright task force included 
Michael Tanner, Chair; Peter Berck; John Canny; Mary Corey (by phone); 
Suzanne Henry; Richard Lucier; Mark Rose; Pamela Samuelson; Kevin Smith; 
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Task Force on Copyright: Report and Recommendations, the 
executive summary asserts, “The University should reaffirm 
the policy that a faculty member owns his or her scholarly and 
aesthetic works.”308  The report advocates that the University of 
California “clarify its commitment to this tradition and 
reassure those who fear that it may lay claim to individual 
faculty works of authorship.”309  In “Ownership, Partnership, 
and Management,” the Report explains that “[t]he University 
and its faculty are partners in the academic mission of creating 
and disseminating knowledge.”310  The report continues: 
“However, the Task Force urges a wide ranging discussion of 
the opportunities that might occasionally make voluntary 
departures from this norm desirable.”311  The report gives one 
factual scenario and two hypotheticals.  The factual scenario 
concerns the digital recording of faculty lectures, and the 
unauthorized selling of the recording to third parties.  The 
question arises whether the faculty or the university owns the 
lecture, creating a further responsibility to sue for 
infringement.  The second scenario concerns the fear that 
administrators are claiming ownership to syllabi and course 
materials in order to create and sell courseware packages in a 
commercial setting, “without the permission or participation of 
the faculty member who created the course.”312  The third 
scenario reverses the second, with the administrators fearing 
that faculty members will package and sell their own syllabi 
and course material.313  The Task Force believes all three 
scenarios are unacceptable and, like the AAUP, that 
partnerships and alternatives must be formed.314  They do not 

Corynne McSherry (graduate student researcher); Martha Winnacker, Jeffrey 
Cole; Stuart Lynn; and Irwin Sherman.  Draft University of California Task 
Force on Copyright Meeting, January 26, 1998, Minutes, 
http://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/copyright/minutes/min012698.html (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2002). 
 308. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29 at “Executive Summary.” 
 309. Id. at 5. 
 310. Id. at 11. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 12.  See also David F. Noble, Digital Diploma Mills: The 
Automation of Higher Education,” Oct. 1997, at 
http://www.uwo.ca/uwofa/articles/noble.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002), where 
he examines the current secret deals created at UCLA extension. 
 313. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at 14.  This is similar to 
the Arthur Miller example at Harvard University, where Harvard protested 
Miller filming lectures for an online law school. 
 314. Id. 
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recommend a blanket policy, but suggest “short term case-by-
case contracts to experiment with the consequences of differing 
allocation of rights.  Contracts could, for example, make 
available instructional development or media resources in 
exchange for vesting all or part of copyright rights in the 
institution.”315  This statement seems to suggest that additional 
resources might prompt a copyright contract with an 
institution, with the faculty-author then negotiating, perhaps 
for the right to make derivative rights, or the right to continue 
using the material after moving to a different university.  It 
also implies that the university would not claim the work under 
a work-for-hire doctrine, but would negotiate a joint authorship 
or assignment of copyright from the faculty-author.  The report 
reiterates that while it will take time to experiment, “UC 
should relieve anxiety by asserting that it will protect both 
institutional and individual interests related to classroom 
lectures and recorded collaborative works by faculty and 
students.”316 
The executive summary also recommends that “UC should 
provide copyright education and services on every campus,” and 
would include both education on how to comply with copyright 
laws when using others’ materials, as well as “how to exercise 
the rights of copyright owners in ways that promote the 
dissemination of knowledge.”317  The executive summary 
continues: “Such information should include case studies and 
model contracts that demonstrate how collaborative works and 
assignment of copyrights to third parties may be managed to 
protect the integrity of works and ensure that they are freely 
accessible for teaching and research.”318 
The Introduction immediately addresses the concern that 
ownership is linked to continued creative and scholarly works, 
but also notes that without clear ownership, commercial 
ventures also cannot go forward.319  The report also notes that 
previously the UC system had a central Copyright, Patent and 
Trademark office, but today “there is no systematic support for 
management of or education about such copyrightable works as 

 315. Id. at 14. 
 316. Id.  The report also points to the 1995 Workgroup on the 
Commercialization of Lecture Materials for notes regarding the allocation of 
rights for lectures. 
 317. Id at “Executive Summary,” No. 5. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at “Introduction.” 
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scholarly writing, creative works of art and music, and 
multimedia course materials,” which the report hopes the 
university rectifies.320 
The report notes two different approaches.  A University of 
Kansas draft policy has taken a different approach, claiming 
ownership on “mediated courseware,” arguing that they are 
created and offered with substantial investment of university 
resources and that the university must be able to use them 
again.  Additional compensation is given to faculty if the 
courseware is used by a different faculty member, and the 
author/faculty member is given the right to create derivative 
works, and “retains the right to transfer institutional rights to 
third parties.”321  Stanford has a more extreme response, 
claiming ownership “of all Stanford course materials.”322  In 
contrast, the report suggests that a myriad of ownership 
scenarios may exist in a multimedia setting where there are 
multiple authors and collaboration, including “joint authorship, 
assignment of rights to a single owner, and University 
ownership.”323  With regard to when the university should own 
a work, the report suggests first that “the University should 
develop a mechanism for evaluating when an investment of 
University resources will encourage the creation of works that 
will enhance the academic mission.”324 
G. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
Columbia University’s copyright policy may serve as a 
model for thoroughness.  Columbia University makes the same 
allowances as the University of Arizona of granting ownership 
in traditional materials, but Columbia also clearly states that 
the form of the traditional materials will not alter ownership 
allocation: “By longstanding custom, faculty members hold 
copyright for books, monographs, articles, and similar works as 
delineated in the policy statement, whether distributed in print 
or electronically.  This pattern will not change.  This copyright 

 320. Id. at 4. 
 321. Id. at n. 12.  See also the University of Kansas policy at 
http://www.ukans.edu/~kbor/ipdraft.html. 
 322. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at n 12.  See also Stanford’s 
Copyright Policy at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/5-2.html (last 
updated Dec. 22, 1998); see also, Patent and Copyright Agreement for Stanford 
Personnel, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/su18.html, (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2002). 
 323. UC Taskforce on Copyright, supra note 29, at 11. 
 324. Id. at 15. 
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policy retains and reasserts those rights.”325  As noted above, 
this was not the case with the University of Arizona, where 
electronic forms were to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
Similar to the University of Arizona, 
Columbia will hold rights in copyright to works of authorship that are 
created at the University by faculty, research staff, and others and 
that are supported by a direct allocation of University funds, are 
commissioned by the University, make substantial use of financial or 
logistical support from the University beyond the level of common 




The Columbia policy also acknowledges that faculty may 
distribute their copyrighted works without permission as long 
as the work is not courseware or course content, action the 
Consortium seems to discourage.  Courseware and course 
content may be distributed for non-commercial use “to 
recipients who agree that they will not make commercial use of 
the material.”327  In each instance, the University does not want 
its name attached, except to identify the faculty member as an 
instructor at the University.  The copyright policy devotes a 
special section to course content and courseware. 328  Using the 

 325. Columbia University, Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright 
Policy, http://columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (last visited Sept. 1, 
2002) [hereinafter Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy].  See 
also, Columbia University, Columbia University Copyright Policy, Section 1. 
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, A. Traditional Faculty Authorship 
Rights, at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (last visited 
Sept 1, 2002) [hereinafter Columbia University Copyright Policy].  Columbia 
uses the language “disseminated” rather than “created in print or 
electronically.”  See id.  In contrast to other policies, this is where the focus 
belongs, as in copyright the form of the creation does not create a new or 
additional copyright, but the creative elements in the tangible form do. 
 326. Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325.  
See also, Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1. 
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, B. Assertion of Rights by the 
University.  Categories in the Columbia policy correspond to those of 
University of Arizona and other universities – additional funds above the 
normal usage, sponsored projects, administrative works, or created or 
commissioned specifically by the University.  The policy explicitly notes that 
“ordinary use of resources such as the libraries, one’s office, desktop computer 
and University computer infrastructure, secretarial staff and supplies, is not 
considered to be substantial use of such resources for purposes of vesting the 
University with copyright ownership in a work.”  Id. 
 327. Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1. 
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, D. Non-commercial Distribution of 
Creator-owned Works. 
 328. Columbia University Copyright Policy, supra note 325, at Section 1. 
Copyright Ownership; Assertion of Rights, E. Categories of Works, No. 2. 
Course Content and Courseware.  Courseware is defined as “the set of tools 
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principle distinction of faculty versus university ownership, the 
section aggressively asserts that the University will claim its 
rights to copyright in course content and may “limit the faculty 
member’s ability unilaterally to commercialize non-
institutional course content and courseware.”329  The university 
will also claim ownership in videotapes of lectures (the object 
themselves) but not the underlying copyrighted work, which 
would be governed by the faculty/university ownership 
distinction above.330  The policy does create another category, 
“institutional courses” that the university would own, but the 
policy does not define them further.  Faculty may participate in 
course creation outside of the university, as long as these 
endeavors do not include “commercialization of any course 
content.”  In fact, any commercialized project must be approved 
“by the appropriate dean and the Provost” in advance.  This 
last point is sticky, because if a faculty member owns the 
copyright to their lectures, and other materials produced 
without additional substantial resources from the university, 
that faculty member retains the right to make derivative 
works, distribute and publicly perform.  Does this mean that 
the faculty is being assigned only part of the rights of 
copyright?  How does this work in a legal context? 
H. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
Georgia Harper, a copyright attorney at the University of 
Texas at Austin has developed a great deal of material on 
university intellectual property policies and has become a 
leader in educating universities and scholars on IP issues.  
Given that the courts are split on whether the “teacher 
exception” exists, she believes it would be unwise to depend 
upon that for ownership rights.331  She suggests that 
teachers/educators do fall under the employee/employer 
relationship, but that one must look to the particular 

and technologies used to present course content, and is independent of the 
content itself.”  Id.  Course content is defined as “the intellectual content of the 
course, as taught at or through the University.”  Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Georgia Harper, Copyright Law in Cyberspace, Office of General 
Counsel, University of Texas System, at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/IntellectualProperty/distance.htm, (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2002).  Look in particular at section entitled, “Ownership in Detail: 
The Employer is the Owner When,” where in reference to the “teacher 
exception” she writes, “reliance is not recommended.” 
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university’s intellectual property for further guidance.332  She 
noted that when determining ownership of joint authors at 
different universities it would be necessary to determine the 
intellectual properties for each author to make that 
determination.333 
Harper has created what she calls a comprehensive 
copyright policy that addresses both using copyrighted works 
and the creation of copyrighted works.334  She notes that in the 
past, with regard to managing and licensing new creations, 
institutions “haven’t taken them or their value very 
seriously.”335  She states that it “is up to us as institutions and 
as an educational community.  These are our works, made by 
us for us.”336 
For the UT system, faculty own “scholarly, artistic, 
literary, musical and educational materials within the author’s 
field of expertise.”337  One wonders why the addition of “author’s 
field of expertise,” how a “field of expertise” is defined, and 
what happens if a scholar writes outside of the field s/he has 
been hired to teach.  Then, a more curious statement is made, 
“[i]f the University wants to use such a work, to recover 
expenses of its creation and/or share in royalties if the work is 
commercialized, it should establish standard University rights 
that apply to such works or negotiate its rights in a contract 
with the faculty author.”338  What expenses are they talking 
about—salary and regular expenses?  Extra expenses?  And in 
what context will the contract be negotiated? 
The policy also exemplifies how traditional spaces 
transformed into electronic forms sometimes create new 
ownership rights, stating “[s]cholarly works owned by faculty 
members can be implemented in software, which is usually 
identified as an invention and owned by the Board.”339  The 

 332. See id. 
 333. See id. 
 334. The U. T. System Comprehensive Copyright Policy, at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/cprtpol.htm (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2002). 
 335. See id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. University of Texas, Who Owns What, at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/whowns.htm (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2002). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id.  The page gives three additional policies to look at: the Intellectual 
Property Policy Section 2.32, Administrative Software Policy, and the 
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taping of lectures is dealt with in the Administrative Policy - 
Regarding Creation, Use and Distribution of Telecourse 
Materials.340  Here, “[f]aculty members . . . hold copyright in 
Telecourse materials they create on their own initiative in the 
course of the performance of their teaching responsibilities.”341  
Thus, Telecourses created by non-faculty and within the scope 
of their employment are owned by the Board. 
Telecourses created by faculty members as a condition of their 
employment fall into the category of works for hire or works created 
by an employee within the scope of employment; thus, copyright in 
such works is owned by the Board. Telecourses created jointly by 
faculty authors and others whose contributions would be works for 
hire will be jointly owned by the faculty author and the Board. Any 
owner of copyright in a Telecourse may secure copyright registration; 
joint owners may, but do not have to, agree to bear responsibility for 
enforcement of the copyright.
342
 
This is one of the first policies to discuss registration.343  
Faculty “should” retain revision rights in the materials they 
create, by specific terms in a contract.344  The policy explains: 
Regardless of who owns copyright in Telecourse materials, faculty 
who participate will undoubtedly wish to retain some control over the 
later use of the materials. Faculty will be reluctant to memorialize 
lectures and other educational materials if they are unable to update, 
revise or eliminate entirely parts of the work that are no longer 

Administrative Distance Learning Policy.  Here is the substance of the IP 
policy: 
2.3 The Board shall assert its interest in scholarly or educational 
materials, art works, musical compositions and dramatic and 
nondramatic literary works related to the author’s academic or 
professional field, regardless of the medium of expression, as follows: 
2.31 Students, professionals, faculty and researcher authors.—The 
Board shall not assert ownership of works covered by this Subsection 
authored by students, professionals, faculty, and nonfaculty 
researchers. The Board encourages these authors to carefully manage 
their copyrights. The Board retains certain rights in these works as 
set forth in the Policy and Guidelines for Management and Marketing 
of Copyrighted Works. 
2.32 Software.—The Board normally shall assert ownership in 
software as an invention; however, original software which is content 
covered by Subdivision 2.31, or that is integral to the presentation of 
such content, shall be owned in accordance with Subdivision 2.31. 
Id. 
 340. See University of Texas, Administrative Policy, Regarding Creation, 
Use and Distribution of Telecourse Materials, at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/telecrs.htm (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
 341. See id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See id. 
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relevant, correct, or are merely no longer timely. Since the Copyright 
Law would not vest the right to revise, edit or even destroy a work 
belonging to another, these rights must be granted in contracts 
between any component and its faculty members who will be 
exercising the rights. Further, since the application of the work for 
hire provisions of Copyright Law does not always bring about the 
allocation of ownership of copyright that the parties may have 
intended, it is important to have a contract to properly address 
ownership issues as well. The contract should include a statement 
that the work is a work for hire, an assignment of copyright to be sure 
that the intended result is realized, and special provisions allowing 
the faculty member to retain a right to edit or modify the original at 
specified times, thus creating a derivative work. A sample contract is 
attached as Attachment B. If this form of agreement is utilized 
without substantive alteration, it should not require review by the 
Office of General Counsel.
345
 
With regard to royalties, the owner takes all—whether it is 
a faculty member creating on their own initiative or the Board 
as part of a faculty’s duties.346  The University will also require 
the faculty to share royalties in traditional scholarly material 
when the faculty has used substantial resources at the 
university, where otherwise all royalties on traditional 
materials, regardless of form, belong to the faculty.347 
The UT site is a great resource.  One page, in particular, 
helps navigate through determining ownership rights 
connected with the creation of courseware.348  The page lets the 
user click the answers to three categories: “Who provided the 
initial impetus to create the Work?,” “Who will contribute 
copyrightable expression?,” and whether the faculty will elect 
to have the work fall under the scope of employment.349  The 
last question, it is explained, is that 
some faculty authors may not wish to own their works, because they 
consider themselves to be employees working within the scope of their 
employment.  In such a case, the faculty member need only sign an 
acknowledgement of this unusual circumstance.  This election shifts 
ownership of the affected contribution to the University and causes 
the standard rules for liability for infringement to control.
350
 
The site also provides sample courseware contracts for 

 345. Id. 
 346. See id. 
 347. See id. 
 348. See University of Texas, Courseware Contracts - Starting with the 
Right Contract, at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/course.htm (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
 349. See id. 
 350. Id. 
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“Faculty Sole Owners,” “Joint Owners,” “Work-For-Hire,” 
“TeleCampus Funded Faculty Owned Contribution to a 
Collective Work,” and “TeleCampus Funded Joint Creation and 
Ownership Agreement.”351 
V. SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS 
Some universities may appear to see copyright as mere 
economics, in that they do not want to give away their potential 
pots of gold.  But more is at stake, both for the university and 
the creators.  Universities have greater obligations beyond 
economics, including the dissemination of information to the 
public.  Many of the steps now being taken are influenced not 
only by the cultural impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed 
federally-funded research to be patented by universities, but 
also by increased amounts of commercial profit from 
trademarks and economic potential in copyrighted works. 
A. LEGAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING UNCERTAIN COPYRIGHT 
OWNERSHIP 
Those creating copyright works must fully understand the 
implications of the policies, so as not to live in fear, confusion or 
misplaced concern.  For those interested in copyright and the 
use of these creations, it is obvious that serious issues remain.  
The following portion of this article will identify four of them. 
1.  Ownership as Duration of Copyright. The length of 
copyright is dependent, in part, on whether the work is a work-
for-hire or created by an individual.  If the work is a work-for-
hire, the duration of copyright is 120 years from creation or 95 
years from publication, whichever is shorter.352  If the work is 
created by an individual, the current term is life of the author 
plus 70 years.353  Complete chaos results from the federal 
statute’s failure to specify who owns the work, leaving 
ownership to individual university policies.  What happens 
when scholars want to use these works in twenty, fifty, or a 
hundred years?  Who will they turn to for permission, or to 
determine whether the work is in the public domain?  Few 
people are concerned about this, since they see most of the 
work as relevant for only a semester or a few years.  In fact, 
many professors use lectures throughout a career, and far from 

 351. See id. 
 352. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (c). 
 353. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a). 
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being disposable, these lectures form part of their lifetime body 
of work.  Uncertain ownership is very troubling, as ownership 
gives the owner certain rights for a certain period of time.  
Without certainty now, a great deal of chaos will emerge in the 
future. 
2.  Registration.  Are these works being registered?  How 
are these works being registered at the Copyright Office?  
Again, the copyright holder must be identified.  Is this based on 
university policy?  Tradition?  If a university claims ownership 
to the material, are they then responsible for registering it as 
well?  As we saw in Part II of this article, with registration 
comes statutory damages and potential attorney’s fees in a 
successful infringement suit.  Moreover, if infringement occurs, 
is the university willing to sue if a creator brings this to their 
attention?  Does university ownership give the creator more 
support to protect their works from others?  The University of 
Texas is one of the few universities addressing this question.354 
3.  Original versus Derivative work.  The copyright owner 
authorizes derivative works.  If ownership is unclear, who does 
the authorizing?  Can a professor, after creating a website for a 
class, write an article using the same materials?  Must 
professors gain permission from the university to make 
derivative works because they were produced in a form in 
which the university has claimed an ownership interest?  Some 
policies address this concern, but many do not. 
4.  The University’s Responsibilities.  With ownership 
comes responsibility.  As mentioned before, registration 
becomes a question, as does dissemination, promotion, and 
prosecuting unlawful infringers.  Will the university create 
Copyright Offices like they have created Technology Transfer 
offices for patents and Licensing Offices for trademarks, in 
order to help facilitate creators getting their products into 
commercially-advantageous situations?  David Perry, in the 
Technology Transfer Office at University of Arizona, noted that 
the university disclaims ownership of patents when the 
technology transfer office determines the invention does not 
have economic potential.355  Instead of spending $10,000 or 
more on the patent application process, the university releases 

 354. See University of Texas, Copyright Registration for Faculty Authored 
Works, http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/faccprt.htm (last 
visited September 15, 2002). 
 355. Interview with David Perry, Office of Technology Transfer, University 
of Arizona, (April 2001). 
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the invention of the item to the inventor.356  In case of later 
success, the university has a built-in contractual mechanism 
that allows the university to share the profits.357  Could the 
university put in place the same sort of policy with textbooks, 
articles, and other traditional materials with copyright?  With 
patents, the university spends money as part of their 
ownership responsibilities.  With copyright, the university need 
not spend, because copyright affixes at the moment of 
creation.358  At most, the university might pay a $30 
registration fee, but the university typically does not do even 
this.  The University of California recognizes this need, with 
the task force recommending the creation of a University 
Copyright Office.359 
B. SURVIVING UNCERTAIN TIMES - THOUGHTS FOR THE 
SCHOLARS 
This article has looked at the increasing commercialization 
of the university, the change in the copyright law, and how that 
has impacted the view of the “teacher exception” and ownership 
of materials within education.360  The article has also looked at 
specific intellectual property policies in the university as 
examples of what is currently happening.  While there are no 
definitive answers, the trend seems to indicate that more 
intellectual property policies in education dictate ownership, 
rather than case law or statute carving out a special “teacher 
exception.”  Teachers, scholars, and researchers must look to 
their institutions to determine who owns the materials being 
created and under what circumstances.  The following offers 
some practical points to take away from this paper on how to 
determine ownership of newly created materials. 
1.  Easterbrook versus Posner.  Easterbrook’s 7th circuit 
decision in Weinstein has, so far, brought the “teacher 
exception” into the realm of university policies.361  Until courts 
decide otherwise, Posner’s dicta in Hayes that a teacher 

 356. See id. 
 357. See id. 
 358. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a). 
 359. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 360. For another overview, see also Dan L. Burk, Ownership of Electronic 
Materials in Higher Education, CAUSE/EFFECT, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall, 1997, 13-
18, at http:// www.educause.edu/ir/library/html/cem9734.html (last visited 
Sept 1, 2002). 
 361. See Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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exception survives outside of university policy, as a judge-made 
doctrine, seems outdated.362  However, the point has yet to be 
decided by any court after the Reid case and remains 
uncertain.363 
2.  Read All IP policies carefully.  As this paper has 
demonstrated, there are many subtle differences in the IP 
policies at colleges and universities.  Read these policies 
carefully, and consider consulting with the university attorney 
for clarification (remaining mindful of the attorney’s 
professional obligation to the client university).  Some policies 
claim ownership in all works, but disclaim ownership on more 
traditional works.  Many claim ownership when a significant 
amount of recourses are used.  Some require copyright 
assignment if the project has commercial potential.  Others 
make the university a joint author.  Some give certain rights to 
faculty members, and keep other parts of the copyright for 
themselves.  Also, make sure to read not merely the IP policy, 
but any additional policies connected to the IP policy, such as 
those on distance learning. 
3.  Claiming ownership in traditional materials before 
creating derivative works.  Because many universities still 
disclaim ownership or allow faculty ownership of traditional 
materials (textbooks, lectures, and other non-digital, non-
electronic forms of scholarly materials), register copyrighted 
work at the Copyright Office, 364 then make a derivative work 
for digital, distance learning, or multimedia projects.365  If 
problems arise later, registration establishes prima facie 
evidence of the ownership of the original.366  The scholar will 
then own the underlying original work, regardless of whether 

 362. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 363. See Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 109. S. Ct. 2166 (1989). 
 364. See Kenneth Crews, COPYRIGHT LAW AND GRADUATE RESEARCH: NEW 
MEDIA, NEW RIGHTS, AND YOUR DISSERTATION, (Proquest Information and 
Learning, 2000), at http://www.umi.com/hp/Support/DExplorer/copyrght/ (last 
visited September 15, 2002) (manual providing a roadmap for copyright 
compliance). 
 365. See Copyright Office Website, at http://www.copyright.gov (last visited 
February 12, 2003). 
 366. It also guarantees statutory damages (without having to prove actual 
damages) and perhaps attorney’s fees, if infringement on the original is found.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 412; § 505.  To do this, a scholar should go to the Copyright 
Office’s web site at http://www.copyright.gov.  Make sure to use the proper 
form.  The Copyright Office has information on the web site on which form 
applies and how to fill the form in.  The process is not difficult, but make sure 
to follow directions. 
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the university claims ownership in subsequent works.  Both 
published and unpublished works may be registered with the 
Copyright Office.367  The university, in that case, will only own 
materials “added” to the original work, and not the original 
work itself.  This means that the scholar can revise the original 
work, create new derivative works, and do all of the other 
things a copyright owner is allowed to do. 
a.  Copyright Registration.  An individual can easily 
register a copyright with the Copyright Office.368  This may be 
done with each individual creation ($30 each) or as a collection 
($30 for the collection).369  However, if an infringement occurs, 
statutory damages only apply to the materials in the collection, 
and not the individual pieces; that is, if it is registered in a 
collection, statutory damages may be awarded only once for the 
collection, rather than on each piece.  That aside, once the 
original work is copyrighted (and registered), the owner may 
create derivative works.  For example, the copyright 
holder/scholar could use additional university resources to 
create a new project, with the original project as the core 
content of the work.  The university might claim ownership on 
the new product, for example, the CD-ROM or the website, but 
the scholar would still own the original work within the new 
medium.  The new university-owned work would be a 
derivative of the original work.  The same applies to lecture 
materials.  If an author valued ownership, s/he could record 
lectures, provide copies of course materials and anything else 
created, and again register them with the Copyright Office.370  
Then, if the university wanted the course to be in an online 
version, s/he would license the right to create an online version 

 367. See Copyright Office Website, at http://www.copyright.gov (last visited 
February 12, 2003). 
 368. Directions are given on the Copyright Office’s website: 
http://www.copyright.gov.  Registration includes filing out the proper form 
(downloadable from the site), and sending two copies of the work, along with 
$30 per registration.  See id. 
 369. Copyright Office, Fees, at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html 
(last visited April 20, 2001). 
 370. Penne Restad, a lecturer at University of Texas, did just that 
[recorded her own lectures], according to reporter Sharon Jayson in Online 
Notes Debate; College Lecturers spilt over propriety of free, AMERICAN-AUSTIN 
STATESMAN, March 26, 2000 at Metro/State B1, in order to combat a 
professional, commercial notetaker hidden amongst her 400 students.  Georgia 
Harper also recommends this at University of Texas.  See University of Texas, 
Ownership of Lectures, at 
www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/lectures.htm. (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
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to the university.  Alternatively, s/he could assign a derivative 
right to make an online version.  However, s/he would retain 
ownership of the underlying materials.371 
b.  Specific student concerns.  If ownership is important to 
a student, the student might think about how s/he is “paid” for 
particular work.  If a student is getting academic credit for a 
creation, the student will own the creation, unless the work is 
collaborative.  When the student does research for credit for a 
professor, there is an implied right for the professor to use the 
materials, but the student has kept the copyright in the notes 
and writings.  If, however, the student is paid for these same 
activities, the situation is more complicated.  This may be 
considered an employee/employer relationship, depending on 
school policy.  However, it may not fit within the categories of 
the Reid test.  Just because a work is labeled as a work-for-hire 
does not mean it is a work-for-hire.  It must satisfy the factors 
of the Reid test.  Then the university, and not the professor for 
whom the research was done, owns the notes and materials.372 
4.  A Special note regarding web sites.  This is an area in 
flux.  At some schools, web sites are not part of required job 
tasks, and if created by the professor, will be the property of 
the professor.  If the web site is created using the labor and 
more than usual amounts of resources at the university, the 
university may claim ownership.  At the University of Arizona, 
the IP policy states that it will decide ownership on a case-by-
case basis on all electronic materials, which means in practical 

 371. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 71, § 5.03[B][1][b][i] n.92 
(citing Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Pubs., Inc., 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(earlier version of Superman created prior to commencement of employment 
relationship held not owned by employer) and Scerr v. Universal Match Corp., 
417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) (interpreting the 
Siegel case as holding that “[t]he first expression of the Superman character 
was the underlying work, and the later development of the character was a 
derivative work.  Because only the derivative work was produced in a for-hire 
relationship, the underlying work remains the property of the creators, absent 
an assignment thereof.”)). 
 372. Indiana University has research assistants sign a copyright 
agreement, which includes, inter alia, 
that any copyrightable works that I may create within the scope of my 
service as a research assistant shall be regarded as “works made for 
hire” under the U.S. Copyright Act.  Should any such works not 
qualify as works made for hire, I hereby assign or transfer any 
copyright interest that I may have in and to such works to Indiana 
University or to my instructor as may be appropriate of reach work. 
Sample Agreement, Research Assistant Copyright Agreement, Indiana 
University, at http://iupui.ed/~copyinfo/raagreemt.html (last visited 
September 15, 2002). 
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terms that they may claim ownership if an electronic medium 
becomes economically profitable.  For those fearful of the 
university gaining control of a web site a number of law review 
articles suggest that faculty not put their materials directly 
onto university servers, but put their work on a separate web 
site, which would then link to their university address.373  That 
way, once the link is removed, the instructor’s work is still 
within their possession, and the university will have no copy of 
the work.  This might be particularly advantageous to adjuncts 
and graduate students, who are not permanent faculty 
members. 
5. The Technology Transfer Office is not all bad.  
Ownership is not the only game in town.  A technology transfer 
office may provide the resources to make the copyrighted work 
turn a profit.  In many cases, they distribute royalties both to 
the instructor as well as the department.  If the instructor is 
thinking about a collaborative project that would involve the 
university, it may turn out to be a very happy experience, and 
the instructor may become, the hero of the department with the 
royalties streaming in.  In this way, it goes to the CETUS’s idea 
of unbundling the rights to serve all of the interests involved. 
6. Reorienting One’s World View.  The days of scholars 
locked away from the commercial/business/corporate world are 
quickly fading.  Scholars must think about the materials they 
create, as well as those they use within a more commercialized 
environment.  Otherwise instructors may find themselves 
colonized and enslaved, providing the raw cultural resources 
for both the university and multi-national corporations.  
Practical steps are needed, and faculties’ voices must ring out 
as copyright policies – nationally and in the universities – 
reorient the game to heightened commercialization of creations.  
Scholars must be aware of the discourses of the laws, customs, 

 373. See e.g., Holmes and Levin, supra note 1 at 188-9.  After writing a law 
review article in which they argue that the “teacher exception” still applies 
today, the authors advocate in their conclusion that 
[f]aculty wishing to preserve ownership rights in copyrightable 
materials they develop would seem to have a stronger argument in 
favor of ownership if they require “passwords” or other limiting 
devices to screen access to the materials.  Faculty might also want to 
consider posting the materials with private service providers rather 
than with school or university providers so as to protect their copyright 
under the 1976 Copyright Act and the DMCA. 
Id.  (emphasis added).  Note that the authors do not give any reason for this at 
all, and give no footnotes or citations as to why they believe this.  See id.  This 
is how they end their article that is pro-”teacher exception.” 
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and concerns of the commerical world.  Much negotation, 
discussion and molding of policy, vision, and values can be 
accomplished.  Scholars must take the discourse theories of 
their academic work and apply them to their academic world.  
Commercialization of the univeristy is not necessarily an evil.  
But scholars should actively engage in the conversation, 
articulating their own views and thoughts, rather than 
allowing the corporate world to dictate the hegemony of the 
new century. 
7. Policy versus Practice.  Scholars should be aware of the 
policies and the laws governing their works, but also recognize 
that within the university some policies are followed, while 
others are not fully enforced.  Some universities may follow a 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.  If they do not know about a 
project, they do not actively seek to find out; yet, if they find 
out, they must pursue ownership issues.  A good rule of thumb 
appears to be that if the work has actual or potential economic 
worth, the university will be interested in claiming ownership.  
Even with patents, if the university does not see it as 
economically advantageous, they will give the ownership back 
to the inventor.  One should be aware of what the practices are, 
and not merely consider the policies. 
8. The Role of Contracts.  A number of scholars, like Todd 
Borow and Ashley Packard, place emphasis on the employment 
contract or specific contracts between the faculty member and 
the university, rather than case-law or even university policies 
alone.374  Both Packard and Borow suggest scholars secure 
copyright through contract, which expressly reserves rights 
scholars feel are of concern.375  This would require scholars to 
have the power and clout to be able to do this.  However, 
Borow, Packard, and others suggest that they do not believe 
the written requirement for assignment under the copyright act 
is satisfied by a university copyright policy.376  Borow explains 
that “handbooks are unlikely to be considered signed writings 
by courts,” and that both parties, not merely the faculty 
member, must sign the express writing.377  This is an area to 
watch in the coming years.  Packard agrees, writing, “[l]egally, 

 374. See Borow, supra note 170; Packard, supra note 49. 
 375. Borow, supra note 170, at 166-67; Packard, supra note 49, at 313-314. 
 376. Borow, supra note 170, at 166-67; Packard, supra note 49, at 313-314. 
 377. Borow, supra note 170, at 168 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Creative Employee and The Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 600 
(1987)). 
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there is some question as to whether a written university policy 
‘satisfies the section 204(a) requirement of a writing signed by 
the professor, or the section 201(b) requirement of a writing 
signed by the professor and the university.’”378 
9. Demand help.  Finally, scholars and educators need not 
figure all of these issues out on their own.  If the university will 
assert ownership over materials, scholars need to ask in return 
for help navigating through the minefields.  At the same time, 
scholars need to make sure it is not a one-way administrative 
dialogue. 
In conclusion, this Article suggests that all is not lost with 
the “teacher exception.”  University policies are still 
recognizing this tradition.  Moreover, educators, like those that 
gathered at the Pew Learning and Technology Program in 
2000, seem to be continuing to advocate for a teacher exception 
with a modified commercial-caveat.  Carol Twigg in Who Owns 
Online Courses and Course Materials? Intellectual Property 
Policies for a New Learning Environment, summarized the 
activities and findings of this conference of fourteen higher 
education leaders, including Kenneth Crews and Georgia 
Harper, held in February 2000.379  The article presents 

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Owns Online Courses and Course Materials? Intellectual Property Policies for a 
New Learning Environment, (2000), at 
http://www.center.rpi.edu/PewSym/mono2.html (last visited February 12, 
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Institutional Cooperation; Dan L. Burk, Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School; Bruce Chaloux, Director, Southern Regional Electronic 
Campus, Southern Regional Education Board; George Connick, President, 
Distance Education Publications; Kenneth D. Crews, Director, Copyright 
Management Center, and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-
Purdue University Indianapolis; Russ Edgerton, Director, Pew Forum on 
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President and Publisher, Archipelago Productions, Robert C. Heterick, Jr., 
Former President, Educom; Sylvia Manning, Interim Chancellor, The 
University of Illinois at Chicago; Christopher J. Rogers, Director of New 
Business Development, and John Wiley and Sons, Inc.. Reporters included 
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scenarios and policy concerns for institutions facing these 
problems, including the possible creation of “academic” pop 
stars through online courses, or competing commercial 
interests in intellectual products created at the university, but 
recognizes that most situations would not become so 
commodified.380  In the end, her summation reiterates that the 
“law” is not settled, and that universities should think through 
what they want and how they want to achieve their goals.381  
Twigg’s article suggests the following: 
We recommend that the default policy position for all institutions 
should be that the faculty member owns the course materials he or 
she has created.  Rather than trying to anticipate all the possible 
exceptions and include them in a policy, institutions may want to 
incorporate “trigger mechanisms” in the primary policy; these would 
define specific situations or conditions that would trigger the 
application of a second policy.  As an example, if the course materials 
are commercialized by someone other than the college or university 
and actually make money, the institution could reserve the right to 
get a certain percentage of royalties to recover any investment it may 
have made.  That percentage should be small, perhaps 5 percent.
382
 
In a way, these high-profile educators endorse the notion of 
the continuation of the “teacher exception,” with the caveat 
that the university would benefit economically (a percentage 
scheme) from materials created that came to have a commercial 
value.  This is similar to universities whose policies transfer 
ownership of patentable material to faculty when the 
university does not have interest in pursing the patent, with 
the caveat that if the patented work becomes profitable, the 
university will still have stake (a percentage) in those profits.  
How it will all turn out in the end, only time will tell. 
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